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The major aim of the study is to establish· whether a relationship exists between the
composition and effectiveness of the board of directors. Selection, particularly selection
procedures became relevant in the study, whether there were different selection
procedures for board of directors in South Africa. Developing common selection
guidelines and board composition profile is an important element of this study.
A case study research method was used to collect data. The sample was drawn from
KwaZulu Natal based companies including 25 director~ of companies not necessarily
members of the companies in our sample. The sample parameters included a listed
conglomerate, municipal funded, unlisted private, black economic empowerment and
parastal companies.
The conclusion is that, composition does impact on the effectiveness of the board of
directors. Secondly, boards of directors have different composition profiles.
Furthermore, their selection procedures differ to an extent. These differences are driven
by the needs of the organization rather than sectoral location. However, sectoral
imperatives do have an influence, which cannot be completely excluded.
Whilst, the study found that there were certain uniform requirements to be met by all
companies in terms of corporate governance, there were certain instances where the
universality of guidelines and/or models and/or perspectives were suspect due to a
number of factors. Accordingly. recommendations and/or guidelines are outlined to
improve effectiveness of the board of directors. These entail amongst other issues:




~ The Chairman's Role
~ The Roles of Chief Executive Officers
.
~ The Role of Executive Directors
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~ The Role of Non-Executive Directors
~ The Executive Director
~ Board Committees
~ Gender Equality and Diversity
~ Compensation of the Board
~ Board Appraisal I Evaluation
~ Shareholder Activism
Enforcement takes precedence over voluntary compliance to corporate
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Corporate governance has become a subject of active academic and keen policy debate
throughout the world. However, this is not confined to academic institutions nor
administrative boundaries. In less than a decade, it has become a major factor in
defining the way board of directors operate and the responsibility of directors (Dr Egon
Zehnder, Zwich 1997).
Corporate governance is often applied narrowly to questions about the structure and
functioning of board of directors or the rights and prerogatives of shareholders in
boardroom decision making (but) a broader view of corporate governance is one that
refers to the whole set of legal, cultural and institutional arrangements that determine
what publicly traded corporations can do, who controls them, how that control is
exercised and how the risks and returns from the activities they undertake are allocated
(Blair, Ownership and Control 1995). Corporate governance is a system by which
companies are directed and controlled.
According to William G Bowen, corporate governance is not only a fascinating subject
where everyone is an expert, the bottom line is, that it has to do with power and
accountability - who exercises this power, on behalf of whom, and how the exercise of
the power is controlled.
No matter how we look at corporate governance, which has gained prominence and
currency, the board of directors, is central to it. There are a number of factors, which
have contributed to this prominence. Put another way, corporate boards and directors
have become primary targets for attention in recent years.
Besides, the fact that boards of directors are accountable to shareholders for overall
company performance, other critical factors come into the equation. The underlying
reasons for the growing interest in corporate governance are: the wide spread demand
for greater degree of accountability from organisations which society sees as exercising
power and the emergence of global markets. Secondly, but more importantly companies
are seen to be too powerful. Public corporations in particular, have always been
powerful institutions, but their influence especially with globalisation, is perceived to have
grown dramatically, partly, because that of politicians has declined. "Corporations
determine far more than any other institution - the air we breathe, the quality of water we
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drink, even where we live. Yet, they are not accountable to anyone" (Robert Marks and
Neill Minow 1991).
Most decisions taken by boards of directors may have far reaching implications for
society. William G Bowen and eminent U.S. authority on boards of directors say, "When
things go wrong at major corporations such as General Motors and IBM, there are
serious consequences for society at large as well as workers, investors and communities
affected most directly. The directors are accountable; it is up to them to guide a
reassessment of strategic. directions and if need be to replace the CEO or see that other
managerial changes are made."
The importance and the impact of board of directors on society has resulted, across the
world in a number of guidelines and codes being drawn up to set out more clearly the
role of the board and so establish the accountability of the board to all the stakeholder
groups although initially and/or primarily to shareholders.
1.2 BACKGROUND
Effectiveness and accountability of board of directors are the basic governance issues
that some of the corporate governance codes and guidelines deal with. Effectiveness is
measured by performance. Ultimately the effectiveness of boards and quality of
leadership that they give to their companies is measured by the financial returns, which
they achieve for their shareholders (Sir Adrian Cadbury 1996).
Board accountability is the key to the legitimacy of the corporate system. Companies are
seen to have power and their use of their power is only legitimised through being
exercised within a recognised framework.
Public criticisms of companies, particularly, conglomerates (seen to be having too much
power) internationally, have centred on the weak influence of shareholders and the lack
of enterprise, leadership and control by boards. The reaction of shareholders
(shareholder activism) to these perceived deficiencies has led to today's focus on
boards, their accountability and effectiveness.
The recent events in Corporate America, Wall Street, UK, Europe and in South Africa
have created a new set of challenges for boards of directors. Directors are expected to
do more and to do it well.
A number of critical questions have arisen:
• What role does the board play in strategic planning?
• What role do boards play in top management succession?
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• How best can it best be positioned to provide oversight to its company?
• Which types of measurements should a board employ to effectively monitor
performance?
• What arethe changing legal responsibilities of directors?
• What are the personal liabilities of directors?
These complex issues have been put under microscopic scrutiny by the failure and
collapse of major corporations.
Board of directors have figured prominently in many sensational stories over the past
few years. Directors are being goaded into action by ever more aggressive institutional
shareholders. Shareholder activism is on the ascendancy. Boards are receiving
unprecedented attention world over.
South Africa's situation is compounded by a number of unique factors, compared to their
first world cousins. The birth of new non-racial democratic society in 1994 did not only
bring a new era but a new way of life enshrined in the constitution of South Africa. This
new way of life is not confined within the boundaries of the political terrain. The winds of
the democratic change go beyond the political system and its institutional framework
(Southey, 1999),
The process of total transformation cannot be complete without the democratisation of
the South African economy and the workplace (Kunene 1998). Companies occupy the
centre stage of the economy. Sir Adrian Cadbury alludes to this when he says, "The
country's economy depends on the drive and efficiency of its companies. Thus the
effectiveness with which their boards discharge their responsibilities determines
"Britian's" competitive position". This applies equally to South Africa.
What compounds and/or complicates the situation in South Africa making it even more
urgent, is that, the advent of democracy has brought certain basic fundamentals, which
need to be incorporated in the way companies do business (Mokoape 1998). These





• Freedom of choice
• Freedom of association
• Freedom of speech
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These are bound to impact on business with far reaching implications (Magwaza 1996).
Fundamental change that needs to take place in South Africa, given the challenges of
the demographic reality, employment equity, black economic empowerment and the
deracialisation of the economy makes it an imperative for board of directors. In short
they cannot remain as they are.
The board of directors play the most crucial, critical and central role in the strategic
direction of the corporation, Gould (1993) argues that South African corporations are at a
critical stage as they attempt to respond to the impact of environmental change,
technology development, globalisation etc. The increasing complexity of the local
business environment coupled with globalisation of markets is placing increasing
demands on corporate leadership (board of directors). The volatile transitional
environment poses a number of questions:
• Are board of directors as currently constituted effective?
• Are they equipped to steer the corporate organisation into a new era?
. .
• Who should be selected to the board?
• Why should these people be selected?
• What skills do they require to add value?
It is the board of directors that must drive the radical change in response to the fast
changing environment.
However, the big question is?
Can the South African board of directors, as they are composed, be equal to the task at
hand?
These are some of the complex issues ranging from board composition to director
selection, induction, compensation and evaluation that we intend exploring, to unleash
the full potential of the South African economy. The boards themselves cannot escape
the changes that are necessary if it is to successfully lead the company to sustainable
prosperity (Malimela 1996).
1.3 MOTIVATION
The inspiration to conduct this study of establishing a link between the composition of
the board of directors and effectiveness is due to the researchers own experiences
within the corporate world. The role, composition and effectiveness of Board of Directors
in South Africa have become relevant and topical given the unprecedented pressures
and complex challenges facing business today. These-pressures and challenges have
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catapulted Corporate Governance into the forefront. The landmark report by Sir
Cadbury in United Kingdom in December 1, 1992 is a clear manifestation of Corporate
Governance gaining currency worldwide.
In South Africa, this was captured to an extent by the Kings' Code of Corporate
Practices and Conduct, Nov 29, 1994, which was severely criticized for falling short of
the landmark United Kingdom Cadbury Report (1992). The recent and second King
Corporate Governance Report (2001) is a bold attempt to respond to that criticism. This
has put the whole question of Corporate Governance and the role of Boards into
perspective. The response of the South African Corporate to the Kings' 11 Corporate
Governance Report poses a critical question on the ability of South African Board of
Directors to realize the maximum value for their stakeholder groups.
Secondly, shareholder activism in South Africa is on the ascendancy. For too long,
South African Shareholders were very passive. The Chief Executive Officer's (CEO).
was law and the Board of Directors decisions were left unchallenged. However, in
recent years we have seen shareholders exercising their rights and powers, questioning
the decisions of either the CEO's or Directors (Roberts,1999).
The Nail Option Scheme, which resulted in Chairman, Dr. Motlana and his colleague
resigning, is a clear example of shareholders activism in South Africa. The IDC I
Anglovaal Mining Alliance against ISCOR's Board decision to unbundle the company
into the steel and mining companies is another case. These show that shareholders in
South Africa are no longer willing to rubber stamp Board Decisions. The recent
DATATEC revolt by shareholders is yet another glaring example of this pro-activism on
the part C?f shareholders. The question that arises, which is directly linked to shareholder
activism are:
• What kind of skills and expertise is required for the directors appointed to
these boards;
• Are the directors not supposed to present the best interests of shareholders?
• Whose interest do they really represent?
• How is this shareholder activism going to impact on the composition of the
boards, the way they function or deliver? (Sunday Times Newspaper, 1999).
Part of the changes or requirements brought by the. ushering of the new Democratic
order in South Africa is the reflection of the Demographic reality in the corporations from
the Board of Directors to the lowest level. There is no question that credible, qualified
and previously disadvantaged individuals should be appointed to the Board of Directors.
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However, the question that remains is whether the influx of Blacks and women into
boards will have a positive or negative impact in terms of effective service delivery to the
stakeholder groups and/or enhanced effectiveness of the boards. To complicate
matters, how is the preponderance of South African companies to appoint high profile
retired Black politician.s to their Boards, going to impact on the effectiveness of the board
of directors?
The fast changing Global environment, the rise of shareholders' activism coupled with
dominance of Institutional Investors, takeovers, mergers and acquisition, demands of the
new political order in South Africa and the need for overall Socio-Economic
Transformation (Economic Liberation) have placed not only the composition of Boards
but duties, responsibilities and role of Board of Directors under microscopic scrutiny
(Malimela 1996).
It is against this background that an investigation of the link between the composition of
the Board of Directors and their effectiveness becomes more relevant.
Critical issues in making boards more effective range from board composition, director
selection, induction, compensation, board evaluation and role of shareholders. These
are some of the issues we will be exploring.
1.4 PROBLEM STATEMENT
In South Africa, the main challenge facing the organization is to enhance robust
corporate governance and effective service delivery; this was discussed extensively
Cadbury Report (1999). This has put the whole question of Corporate Governance and
the role of Boards into perspective. For instance, there is still much resistance in South
Africa in disclosing fully the remuneration packages of Directors, which in United
Kingdom and United State of America is the norm. Separation of chairman and chief
executive positions in South Africa is almost nonexistent. South African Board of
Directors is still dominated by executive directors of the business rather than non-
executive directors who are independents. Independent non-executive directors have
no allegiance to any particular group. The resistance to fUlly embrace not only the
change in the composition of the board of directors and transparency poses a critical
question mark on the ability of South African Board of Directors to realize the maximum
value for their stakeholder groups. This study will therefore look at the link between the
composition of the Board of Directors and their effectiveness. (Is there a relationship
between the way the boards are composed and their effectiveness?)
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Boards as we have indicated elsewhere cannot remain as they are.
Who should be on the board and who should not?
The test is the contribution, which the board as a whole makes to the company. Boards
are teams and to be successful ~hey need members with different attributes and skills.
Board effectiveness might be dependent on the selection of the team and on the
leadership of the chairman. A number of critical questions come to the fore:
• Are there different selection procedures for Board of Directors in South
Africa?
• Do parastatals, private and public sectors have different composition of the
Board of Directors?
• Is there a correlation between the composition of the Board of Directors and
effectiveness?
• Are there commonalities in selection guidelines as well as composition of the
Board of Directors in all sectors?
1.5 OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECT
• To determine whether there is a relationship between composition a.nd
effectiveness of board of directors
• To find out if there are different selection procedures for Board of Directors in
South Africa.
• To establish whether parastatals, unlisted private, listed public
(conglomerate), municipal funded or black economic empowerment
companies have different composition of the Board of Directors.
• To develop common selection guidelines and board composition profile.
1.6 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
This study may be limited by lack of cooperation and support from the Chairpersons of
relevant Board of Directors. Since permission from the directors identified in the sample
will be obtained they may suspect that this study will publicize its findings and thus harm
their companies.
This applies to individual directors who might not be willing to participate and express
their views. Availability of accurate statistics in terms of gender and racial profile of
boards of directors is a constraint.
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This is an introductory chapter that presents the problem to be investigated, the aims of
the study and hypotheses that will guide this study.
Chapter Two
This chapter deals with the relevant literature, relevant studies and corporate
governance guidelines from studies on the correlation between the composition and
effectiveness of boards of directors. Our model is developed pertaining to the complex
issues of board structure and size, director selection, distribution of power, induction of
directors, compensation of directors, board evaluation, gender equality, diversity and .
shareholder activism.
Chapter Three
Chapter three deals with research methods used in this case study and the research
design, research instruments and their administration are also discussed.
Chapter Four
Chapter four presents the results as well as their analysis. The results are presented in
the form of tables and figures. Findings of this study are presented and evaluated
Chapter Five
Chapter five presents the conclusion and recommendations.
1.8 SUMMARY
This chapter has clearly indicated the critical questions to be answered as well as aims
and hypotheses of the study including limitations of the study. The critical issue being to
establish whether there is a relationship between composition and effectiveness of board
of directors. Issues that have become central to corporate governance.
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CHAPTER TWO
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPING A MODEL FOR THE
COMPOSITION OFTHE BOARD OF DIRECTORS.
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The aims of this study is to find out if there are different selection procedures for Board
of Directors in South Africa; establish whether parasta~als, private or public sectors have
different composition of the Board of Directors; determine whether there is a link
between the composition and effectiveness of the board of directors, develop common
selection guidelines and board composition profile. These aims are looked at in different
sections in this chapter. Through defining, describing and developing a theoretical
model, primarily for the composition of the board of directors, the aims of the study will
be achieved. It is necessary to review the critical issues that impact and shape the
dynamics relevant to the composition of the board. Among such factors, effectiveness of
the board of directors is an important factor to consider (King, 2002). The model or
framework for the composition of the board of directors that is being developed will form
the basis of the guidelines for how the composition of the board of directors should be.
Such guidelines will determine the terms on how boards should be composed or
constituted. Some of the critical issues that are relevant to board composition are
outlined:
(i) The structure and the size of the board
. (ii) The selection of the board members
(iii) Induction of directors







• Non-executive directors with interest
• Independent non-executive directors (outside directors)
(v) Compensation of directors
(vi) Gender equity and diversity
(vii) Evaluation of directors
16
(viii) Shareholder activism (Cadbury, 1997).
The composition of the board of directors is a critical element in ensuring the
effectiveness of the board. There are a number of questions that need to be answered
in this section. They include, inter alia.
•. How the board is constituted?
• Who is selected in the board?
• Who serves in the board?
• What are the expertise, knowledge and experience required for members of the
board to be effective?
• How does the board apply itself as a collective entity? .
• How does the board harness the unique abilities of each board member?
The answers to these questions will unlock the full potential of boards as well as benefit
the guidelines on the composition of the board of directors and how this can be made to
be more viable (Davies, 1999).
2.2 BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS IN SOUTH AFRICA.
In South Africa, companies have directors who are assigned the responsibility to control.
the company. The shareholders are the owners of a company because they appoint
directors who then control the company on their behalf. The powers of the directors are
set out in the constitution of the company. The shareholders can alter the powers of
directors or sometimes remove the directors when necessary. The latter happens, for
instance, when a director receives a lot of criticism, such as mismanaging the company,
not fUlfilling hisl her duties or even the failure of a company (Gloeck and de Jager,
1995). Since most companies in South Africa have non-executive directors, who are
outsiders, usually they are not excluded from any criticism. Even though as outsiders
they devote only part of their time to the affairs of the company, and is consequently at a
disadvantage to the executive directors, their legal responsibility is no less than that of
executive directors (Khoza, 2000).
It has been reported in other studies, (Cohen, 1972), that, in spite, of the increased
attention accorded to directors, very few directors seem to know what they are supposed
to do and what the company expects from them. There is a need to investigate the
practical functioning of boards of directors and the issues, which lead to effective boards.
One crucial issue about this is that boards do not make decisions, and that the key
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function of the board is the selection of management. Therefore the key factor in an
effective board is dependent on the relationship between the chairman and the chief
executive (Wessels, 1988).
Corporate governance in South Africa was institutionalised after the Publication of the
King Report on Corporate Governance in November 1994 (King Report, 1994). The King
Committee on Corporate Governance formed in 1992, under the auspices of the
Institution of Directors, considered corporate governance an area of increasing interest
around the world and in South Africa. The purpose of the King Report of 1994 was, and
remains, to promote the highest standards of corporate governance in South Africa. This
means in governance terms that one is accountable in common law and by statute to the
company, for instance, a director is responsible to the stakeholders (Mbabane, 2000).
The 1994 King Report is now commonly known as King· I Report. These
recommendations are superseded by legislation in the social and political transformation
that coincided with its release. Some of the more significant legislations that superseded
the King's Report recommendations are the Labour Relations Act (No. 66 of 1995), the
Basic Conditions of Employment Act (1998) and Environmental Management Act (No.
107 of 1998). During this time some of the recommendations for statutory amendments
to the Companies Act (No. 61 of 1973) (Companies Act) contained in the King Report
1994 were promulgated, thereby permitting companies to obtain liability insurance cover,
indemnifying their directors and officers, compelling disclosure of the identity of
beneficial owners of shares held by nominees, and making it mandatory to appoint the .
secretary, for public companies with a share capital. Other legislative developments
since the publication of the King Report 1994 include the introduction of the Insider
Trading Act (No. 135 of 1988) providing for more rigorous supervision and monitoring of
insider trading, the Public Finance Management Act (No. 1 of 1999) bringing into force
more stringent provisions for reporting and accountability by adopting an approach to
financial management in government, that focuses on outputs and responsibilities rather
than the driven approach under previous legislation, and a comprehensive update of the
provisions and regulations governing the Banks Act (No. 94 of 1990) enforcing
substantially higher levels of corporate governance compliance and risk reporting in
banking institutions. Also, notable in this period has been the priority accorded to
corporate governance practices in state enterprises culminating in the releases of the
Policy Framework for State Owned enterprises by the Department of Public enterprises
in August 2000, which is in the process of being comprehensively updated (Malherbe
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and Segal; 2000). The most challenging question in South Africa today is the
relationship between corporate governance and performance. It is now that research in
this area is conducted. Previously, it was considered that it's adifficult area of research,
because of. the complexity of the relationship as well as the measurable aspects of
governance such as· the proportion of outside directors or the extent to which directors
are shareholders, are of limited relevance (King, 2002).
It seems that institutional shareholders in South Africa are now ready to bring pressure
on the boards of companies whose results are failing to meet their expectations. In
South Africa. Boards, and particularly their outside' directors, are responding to these
pressures and are monitoring the executive management of their enterprises more
closely than they did in the past. In most instances, the directors are no longer
considered to be agents of the company. The board is recognised as a primary organ of
the company, as well as its controlling mind (Clutterbuck and Waine, 1994).
2.3 THEORETICAL FOUNDATION FOR THE COMPOSITION OF BOARD OF
DIRECTORS IN SOUTH AFRICA.
Whilst this study does not purport to confine itself only to the examination of the
composition of the board of directors, it will determine any direct scientific proven
correlation between the board composition and board effectiveness. Moreover, it would
be amiss not to test this if the opportunity presents itself (Botha and Jooste, 1997). The
examination of sL!ch a relationship should be carried out in a perceptual meaningful
manner, using a case study. The case study forms our research approach. It would also
be important that the development of the model in this study be informed by the King 11
Report on Corporate Governance (King, 2002). By compiling relevant and sufficient
progress in the implementation of this important tool, this is, King Report of 2002;
coupled with King's report issued in November 1994; a clear analysis of the composition
of the board and its effectiveness will be compiled through case analysis. The
development of the proposed model can only gain in value by adding to current trends
based on recommendation list.
King 11 report on corporate governance since its release in January 2002, has gained a
broad consensus amongst the South African Corporate Community.
The detailed presentation on the recommendations of the King report on corporate
governance, particularly those regarding the critical issues around board composition will
be highlighted elsewhere in this chapter.
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It would be important to observe that whilst Kings' Reports have occupied the center-
stage on Corporate Governance Debate, the input of other key stakeholder groups can
only be ignored at our own peril, in developing a model that can be guide over time.
Although it is an accepted fact that the input of these critical players do not deal with all
the issues of corporate governance per se, in their focus, but promote equity within the
South African economy, it would be appropriate to utilize their contributions especially in
regard to the composition of Board of Directors (Roussouw, 2002). These key players
include:.
~ Black Management Forum. (BMF)
~ National Federated Chamber Of Commerce. (NAFCOC)
~ Durban Growth Coalition (DGC)
~ National Government (Through the employment equity Act)
It is of utmost importance that this model is developed to measure and be equal to
International Bench Marks. These measures include; Sir Adrians ground breaking report
on financial aspects of Corporate Governance UK. Many international commentators
and experts in the field of corporate governance have pronounced that King 11 Report is
broader in scope and more balanced than other works on the same subject from first
world countries; such as Britain, Canada, United States of America, etc. It is also
important to incorporate recent concepts such as the stakeholders. This concept widens :
the responsibility of directors to include employees and their trade unions, clients,
suppliers and anyone else affected by the business (Cadbury, 1997).
The Institute of Directors magazine in its special publication of January and February
2002 titled Enterprise with Integrity says, It When Sir Adrians Cadbury author of the
groundbreaking Cadbury Report on Corporate Governance read the draft for public
comment on the King 11 Report on Corporate Governance declared that nothing more
comprehensive on the subject had ever been published". However, for our purposes, it
is not the comparativeness of Cadbury and Kings Reports that is of significance, but
what board composition can harness from these reports.
It is important and appropriate that a brief exploration of each element that is associated
with board composition and related issues as identified preViously is covered in this
section:
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(i) The structure and the size of the board
It is true that the most important question about any Board of Directors is the character
and the ability of men and women who are on it. The structure and the size of the board
can hinder, impede or facilitate the effectiveness. The effectiveness of the board is
buttressed by its structure and procedures. One aspect of the structure is the
appointment of committees of the board, such as the audit, remuneration and
nomination committees (Coulson-Thomas, 1993).
The need for Board Committees is no longer a legal entity, as they become power
centres in their own right. As the board faces unprecedented demands the committee
system is proving versatile and facilitates effectiveness. It allows for detailed attention to
specific areas of directors' duties and responsibilities and a more comprehensive
evaluation of specified issues such as audit, internal control, risk management,
remuneration etc. Committees can help share the board's workload. Being smaller,
directors serving the committee can go into greater details and deal with complex issues
where the full board might not have had enough time. This also begs the questions of:
• How big should boards be?
• Are the boards having too many directors or not?
• What is the appropriate size for the boards to be effective?
• Does the Board Committee structure suggest that there is an inherent
problem within size of the boards today?
• Are they too cumbersome?
• Has size anything to do with cohesiveness?
One of the rationales behind the board committee structure is to prevent a governance
task from becoming "every ones' responsibility but lino-ones jobs". It seems apparent
that a duty that remains diffused throughout the board as a whole, too often becomes
fast in a shuffle. Thus he argues for committees, as they are smaller than the board as a
whole. Obviously, there must be some concern about the appropriateness of the board
size (Coulson-Thomas, 1993).
(ii) Selection of board members
It has already been indicated that the character and the ability of directors are crucial
and critical elements, not only in the composition of boards, but also in its effectiveness.
Some observers have actually argued that the character and the ability of men and
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women who occupy seats in corridors of corporate power make the difference in the
overall performance of the companies. Whilst this debate can be a subject of a separate
and focused study - the selection and appointment of directors in the boards cannot be
ignored (Carver, 1990).
"Numbers in the boardroom may be statistics, but who goes into those numbers and how
and why are they recruited continues to change" (the Corporate Director. J.M. Juran and
J. Keith Jouden, American Management Association) Selection and Appointment of
Directors has not inspired confidence nor shows any streak of objectivity.
Traditional people were nominated to the board through the suggestion and support of
the CEO or Managing Director. This was the beginning and the end of the matter, with
the endorsement by the nomination committee (if one existed), then by the whole board
and approval by shareholders serving only as legal punctuation of the process. In a
company the shareholders. are the owners because they appoint Directors who then
control their company on their behalf. Shareholders are responsible ultimately for
electing or removing board members. It is in their interests that the board is properly
constituted. The shareholders can alter the powers of Directors or sometimes remove
the Directors when necessary. However, it is doubtful that in practice, shareholders have
been proactive in the selection of Directors. Chief Executives or / and powerful board
members individually and/or collectively tended to hold· a sway in the selection and
appointment of Directors. As long as the CEO and/or any other powerfUl force on the
board selected directors on the strength of their connections, nepotism, cronyism and
malleability, it was indeed an adequate process. However, today's demands coupled
with high rate of corporate failure, personal legal liabilities, rise of shareholder activism,
the country club approach or legal liabilities, school network became less than practical
(Coulson-Thomas, 1993).
In South Africa we have seen a trend of selection of high-ranking politicians into boards,
From Cabinet Ministers, etc.· for instance, Ramaphosas, Sexwales, Mac Maharaj and
Jay Naidoo former Minister of Transport and Minister of Telecommunication,
respectively. Today's boards places high premium on expertise and skill. Whilst
standing and reputation in the community is important, experience and knowledge,
expertise and professional skills should take precedence. What the director knows has








• Telecommunications and Technology
• Service industries (Zimmerli, 2000).
The selection and appointment of board members has become one of the most
important issues in effective Corporate Governance because of the need to balance the
mix of skills and experience and other critical qualities required on the board and in
overseeing a process for assessing the effectiveness of the board as a whole (Coulson-
Thomas, 1993).
(iii) Induction of directors
Directors should know exactly the expectations of their stakeholders. Some studies
have indicated that many directors are not familiar with neither shareholder expectation
nor their duties and responsibilities. It has been reported in other studies (Cohen 1972)
that in spite of increased attempts accorded to directors very few directors know what
they are supposed to do and what the company expects of them. The advent of
personal liabilities, the complexity of the· business environment,. and heightened
stakeholder expectations places huge and severe duties and responsibilities on
directors. New directors appointed to the board should be made familiar with the
companies' operations, Top and Executive Management and its business environment. ..
New directors should be familiar amongst a number of issues with:
• The marketplace, including competitors market development.
• Processes of the business including underlying technology and developments.
• The financial position
• The employees and labour relations
• Social and community relations
• The General Economic, Social, Political situation internationally
New directors should be made aware of their fiduciary duties, responsibilities and
obligations. The induction programme should meet the specific needs of both the
company and the individual to maximize Directors contribution as quickly as possible.
Whilst the induction programme is critical - as it orientates the new Director, joining a
board, an ongoing learning about the corporation and its industry is equally important
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coupled with governance basics (van Wyk and Hofmeyer, 1997). The governance
basics include:
• The function and organization of board committee
• Board responsibilities and legal liabilities
• Compensation design, Investor relations, Financial and operating relations
• Boardroom Rules and procedure (Carver, 1990)
(iv) Distribution of power
Where does the power in boards lie?
Maybe it would be more appropriate and relevant if the following questions were posed
to ensure board effectiveness. Does the power consonant with the legal responsibilities
of directors andlor conventional rules. Every public company in particular should be
headed by an effective board, which can both lead and control the business. Within the
context of the UK, US and South Africa, Unitary Board system prevails. unlike. the
GermanlJapanese model. This means. a single board made-up of a combination of .
Executive Directors and non-Executive Directors. Shareholders are responsible for
electing board members and it is in their interest to see that the boards of these
companies are properly constituted and not dominated by one individual (Cadbury,
1997).
Directors it has been argued, especially in the Cadbury Report that they are equally
responsible .in law in boards' actions and decisions. Certain Directors may h~ve
particular responsibilities as executive or non-executive Directors, for which they are
accountable to the board. Sir Cadbury says, "Regardless of specific duties undertaken
by individual directors, however, it is for the board collectively to ensure that it is meeting
its obligations". Against this background we have to determine the optimal location of
power in the board of directors:
• Who is the boss?
• Who should be the boss?
• How independent are directors?
Let us now deal with each significant component in the location of power and attendant
dynamics.
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(v) Chairman of the board
Tests of board effectiveness in the way in which members of the board as a whole are
together under the chairman, whose role in cooperate govemance is fundamental and
their collective ability to provide both the leadership and checks and balances which
effective govemance demands (van Dorsten, 1992).
The chairman's role in reviewing good cooperate govemance is crucial. The chairman is
the captain of the ship who should be able to stand sufficiently back from the day to day
running of the business to ensure that the board of directors is in full control of the
companies' affairs and alert not only to its obligations to shareholders but all critical
stakeholders groups. The distinct roles of Chief Executive Officer and board chair are
less distinct in most US boardrooms. However, in South Africa despite Kings
recommendations, the situation is not dissimilar with the US. Cadbury recommendations
in UK have been taken seriously where the separation of chairman and CEO is most
prevalent, South African companies such as SAB, Old Mutual and Dimension Data, have
had to conform to these stringest, but novel requirements. Dr Meyer Kahn was relieved
of his CEO role in S.A.B.; this applies to Mike Levett who also relinquished his CEO
position. In the case of Jeremy Ord of Dimension Data he stood down as chairman
when it listed in UK but remains CEO. Separation of the two posts is a testing
requirement in United Kingdom (van Dorsten, 1992).
Because of the importance of the chairman's role, it should be separated from that of the
chief executive. If the two roles are concentrated in one person, it represents a
considerable concentration of power. No wonder most reports on corporate govemance
including King I and King 11 reports have recommended the separation of role.
(vi) Chief executive
The King 11 Reports on the role and function of CEO departs by saying "The CEO has a
critical and strategic role to play in the operational success of a company business. For
this reason, as already indicated, the role of the chief executive should be separate from
that of the chairperson".
Traditionally, CEO's, however, have been the most powerful sources within Corridors of
Corporate Power. The CEO once ruled without question or challenge. The CEO's word
was final but not any more. Today the board asks more questions to evaluate the CEO's
performance, and digs at all the levels of the company. For the CEO attending to board
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members and being nice to them is not enough, suddenly, the CEO's "Directors" want
and have the power to demand results (Clutterbuck and Waine, 1994).
The arguments against combining the position of the CHAIR and CEO in one-person do .
not only seem irresistible but most compelling. However, the question that we won't
answer now is simply -"So why does it continue unabated in South Africa and US where
it is common practise to have one person as CHAIR and CEO?" (Malimela 1994).
(vii) Executive Directors
Directors who are employed by the company are referred to as executive directors. In
addition to their board duties, executive directors carry out executive functions for which
they are remunerated separately. The board delegate the day- to-day management of
.the company to the executive directors. The extent of the duty of care and skill of
executive directors depends to a considerable degree on the nature of the company's
core business and on any particular obligation assumed by or assigned to him. The
exe'cutive directors must therefore exercise more care in executing such tasks. In that
regard there is a difference between the so-called full-time executive director and part-
time non-executive director. The full-time executive director participates in the day-to-
day management of the company's affairs. The degree of care expected in an executive
director differ from that expected in a non-executive director.
Since the executive director participates in the day-to-day management of the company, .
he/she is therefore bound to give continuous attention to the company's daily affairs
(Clutterbuck arid Waine, 1994).
(viii) Non- Executive Directors
Directors, who are not employed by the company full-time, are referred to as non-
executive directors or sometimes called unaffiliated directors. They do not take part in
the day-tO-day management of the company and rely on the management for the report,
which appear before them. The report is usually tabled at board meetings. Non-
executive director are appointed. to boards because they can provide a wider
perspective, fresh stimuli, wider strategic horizons and an enhanced sense of general
responsibility. He! she acts in a dual capacity. In respect of each capacity he! she has a
different set of rights, powers and duties to those that may be assigned to the full-time
executive director. For instance, when an executive director is removed from office it
does not necessarily follow that he! she will be dismissed as an employee. As an
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employee, he! she will be entitled to the protection provided for in labour laws of the
country (Lorsch, 1989).
The duties of non-executive directors are as general rules have been, less time-
consuming than those of executive directors in the past. The legal rules are the same for
all directors. In application of these rules each case determine how they are applied. In
countries such as the United Kingdom, the overwhelming majority of listed companies
appear to have established an "audit committee", and a "remuneration committee" with a
preponderance of non-executive director. A committee of non-executive directors could
be established to review the performance of executive directors and the effectiveness of
the board. This strategy works well so far, among these companies.
(ix) Independent Non-Executive Directors (Outside Directors)
The outside directors or independent non-executive directors of the Board should at
least meet in Executive Session three times each year. The format of these meetings
includes a discussion with the Chief Executive Officer on each occasion. The Board
believes that there should be no current relationship between an outside director and
general manager that would be construed in any way to compromise any board, as long
as the member is designated independent.
The approach to be used in describing the non-executive direc:tors and their roles will be
presented step-by-step in the following outline.
First step involves explaining the reality of cooperative governance, this will include:
• Examining who serves on boards
• How they are selected
• What motivates them to take board seats
Such an analysis will help to evaluate the perceptions that are usually expressed by
Chief Executive Officers who also serve as a director of other companies. The
perception that there has been a growing predominance of outside directors who are
there not only to provide a new perspective to top management's thinking, but, also to
provide necessary oversight only possible from an outsider.
This perception reflects a general consensus that an increasing proportion of outside
directors is a positive step. While not disputing the trend, recent findings reveal that
despite serious motives for joining boards, many directors still feel they are serving at
the pleasure of the Chief Executive Officers or Chairman. This is true even though 74%
of directors are now outsiders, of whom 69% are non-management personnel with no
27
other contact with the company. The remaining 5% are indirectly affiliated with the
company as bankers, lawyers, or retired executives. Exact comparative data is scarce,
but considering that in 1938 only 58% of United States companies had a majority of
outside directors, and by 1979 that proportion had grown to 83%, one can thus assume
a sharp increase in the number of outside directors per individual company. As the
percentage of outside directors has increased, the challenge of locating qualified
candidates has grown (Carver, 1990).
(x) Compensation of Directors
A Managing Director is entitled to remuneration only if the articles provide for
remuneration and the Board exercises its power to award him.
Lorsch and Maclver (1989) argue that linking some of the managing directors
compensation directly into the company's long-term financial performance, might
encourage directors to focus on their broader responsibilities. Such compensation might
be in stock options tied to company performance, which would vest, for instance, the fifth
to. ninth year out. Another possibility is an annual grant of a fixed number of shares to
directors. These proposals are believed to have merit for motivational or psychological
reasons. These options give directors a sense of identification with the company and a
feeling of success (Cadbury, 1997).
(xi) Evaluation Of Directors
Most companies frequently measure the output of managers, however, companies find it
hard to measure performance of directors. This is due to uncertainty as to what should
be measured. Nash (1991) pointed out that, it is important to have a precise idea of what
is expected of directors. Given the broad range of involvement, a director may have with
a company, it is not easy to define a generic set of measurements, which enable
shareholders and executives to jUdge their worth. However, it should be a standard part
of the appointment process to devise with a newly appointed independent director just
how his or her performance will be evaluated. Measurements that can be applied include
the following:
~ Contribution to establishing a strategic direction
~ Type and extent of alternative experience he or she is able to bring to bear
on discussions.
~ Influence on key decisions
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It is suggested that non-executive directors should be appraised using a matrix that
shows the effectiveness in each expected role against the importance of the role within a
particular Board. The directors themselves can conduct this appraisal process. The
same kind of matrix can be used to assess each of the skills or competencies in terms of
importance and effectiveness. The most difficult issue is who should, appraise the
independent director? Theoretically, at least it should be the chairman, but practically
this may pose a problem in a company where independent directors do not fully support
the chairman. A strategy for doing this appraisal system needs to be developed in line
with expected outcomes (Nkuhlu, 2000).
(ix) Shareholder Activism
Shareholder activism is an important component in effective governance, but it is not
visible in most South African Companies. The need to have shareholders support is a
crucial governance issue due to the growing' influence of investors. The fundamental
reaso'ns behind this, is an increasing proportion of shares owned by the investing
institutions. For instance, the pension funds alone now own about one-third of the shares
of British companies and institutions in total (Cadbury, 1997). The rapid growth world
wide of investment is being driven by institutions, which now hold a high proportion of
the equity in shares and can no longer easily sell their shares, if they lose confidence in
the way a company is being run. This means that they have a collective interest in using
their influence as shareholders to improve corporate performance. It is vital that
strategies for enhancing shareholder activism in South African are needed in order to
ensure the effectiveness of the board (Khoza, 2000).
(x) Gender equity and diversity
Shareholders should continue to focus on boardroom governance, but this focus must
include the broader debate towards the investing issues of gender equity and diversity
within their institutions. The issues of power and accountability are important because
they spill over to corporate boards and board governance. These should be raised in the
context of the growing power debates and relative lack of practical steps in
implementation of gender equity strategies in many boards.
2.4 CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE KING'S REPORT
The Kings report points out that the most difficult of all tasks of the board is the
relationship between corporate govemance and performance. It is not readily
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susceptible to research, because of the complexity of the relationship and because
measurable aspects of governance, such as the proportion of outside directors or the
extent to which directors are shareholders are of limited relevance. In most instances
what matters is the calibre of the directors concerned. This is an important reason for
preferring market regulation, where possible over statutory legislation. The law has to
deal with form, but what counts is substance, on which investors are in a position to
make a judgement. This can thus be translated into improved performance. The
recommendations that were drawn point to the broad principles that must address the
various organisations around the world. These include:
~ Clear board responsibility
This indicates the need for absolute clarity about the powers and duties of a·
board, addressing the key question, 'what is the board therefore and what are the
responsibilities?" (King, 2002).
~ Board Composition
The major issue to be dealt with is board composition. This includes, who should
be on the board and who should not? There is a general agreement that board
should include members who are 'independent'. This is to help resolve conflicts
of interest and to ensure objectivity in board decision making processes. This
also gives breadth to the debates on such matters as strategy and the wider
external question with which boards deal (Cadbury, 1991).
~ Board Selection
Board structures aim to combine the detailed knowledge of executive directors
with the wider experience of outside directors, either separately through a two-
tier board or together on a unitary board.
~ Director supply and demand
This is mostly an issue that do not receive much attention, but has relevance on
particular issues where directors have traditionally been drawn from a small or
largely self-selected pool (Southey, 1999).
~ Board size
The most specific advice on board size is Lorsch and Liptons (1989) statement:
"The size of a board should be limited to a maximum of ten directors, indeed
boards of eight or nine are favored. " the argument here, is that boards of this
size allow the directors to get to know each other, to participate fully in
discussions and to reach a true consensus. This approach to bUilding an
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effective board team is surely right, although international companies are
increasingly looking at strengthening their boards with directors from other
countries.
~ Independence
Boards should develop their own criteria for selecting board members with the
over-riding requirement tnat there should be a majority of 'unrelated' directors.
Boards should favour outside directors more (Roberts, 1999).
~ The chairman's role
The importance of the chairman's role in transforming the board of directors into
an effective board is vital. The recommendations on board selection and on
balancing executive knowledge with outside experience are designed to ensure
that the membership of boards is appropriate to the challenges facing their
companies. Equally, proposals that directors should be appointed for fixed terms,
with re-appointment possible but not automatic, enable chairman to renew their
boards as circumstances, or the contribution of individuals (King, 1999).·
~ Board leadership and control
Most reports on board failures pay particular attention to the control. and
supervisory aspects of a board's tasks. They are basically written for unitary
boards, made uP. of executive and outside directors in varying proportions.
Boards must be free to drive their companies forward, but exercise that freedom
within a framework of effective accountability. This is the essence of any system
of good corporate governance (Sir Cadbury).
~ Board committees
Committees of the board are important since they carry out the board work and
the way, in which they strengthen the position of the outside directors, of whom
they are largely composed (Gould, 1993).
~ Financial controls
A particular duty of boards is to establish an effective system of internal financial
control. This helps to prevent frauds and failures, which often lead to the creation
and the need to resolve a degree of confusion about the precise responsibilities
of directors and auditors in the matter (Ward, 1997).
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~ Board appraisal
The key objectives of corporate governance are to promote board effectiveness
and to help boards give companies the leadership to which they are entitled. It is
thus imperative to develop board appraisal systems.
These should be in line with the board charter that set out its responsibilities, and
they should be disclosed in its annual report. At a minimum the charter should:
• Confirm the boards' responsibility for the adoption of strategic plans
• Monitoring of operational performance and management
• Determination of policy and processes to ensure the integrity of the
company's risk management and internal controls
• Communications policy
• Director selection, orientation and evaluation.
This will allow the board to determine the company's purpose, values and
stakeholders relevant to the business of the company and develop strategies
combining all three elements. The board will thus ensure that procedures are in
place to monitor and evaluate the implementation of its strategies, policies,
senior management performance criteria and business plans. Ultimately the
board will be able to· direct the company, exercise the leadership, enterprise,·
integrity and judgement based on fairness, accountability, responsibility and
transparency. Given the positive interaction and diversity of views that take place
between individuals of different skills, experience and background, the unitary
board structure with executive and non-executive directors remains appropriate
for South African companies. It will be an important step if the board give
strategic direction to the company, appoint the chief executive officer and ensure
that succession is planned. This will enable the board to retain full and effective
control over the company, and monitor the management in carrying out board
plans and strategies (King, 2000).
~ Effective Board
In order for companies to achieve expected effectiveness, an effective board that
can both lead and control the company should head the company. The board
should comprise a balance of executive and non-executive directors preferably
with a majority of non-executive directors of whom sufficient should be
independent of management for shareowner interest (inclUding minority interests)
to be protected. An obvious consideration for South African companies would be
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to consider the demographics in relation to the composition of the board. An
effective board will ensure that the company complies with all relevant laws,
regulations and codes of best business practice, and that it communicates with
its share owners and relevant stakeholders (internal and external) openly and
promptly and with substance prevailing over form. This coupled with board's
regular review of processes and procedures to ensure the effectiveness of the
company's internal system of control, so that its decision-making and the
accuracy of its reporting are maintained at a higher level at all times. The board
should meet regularly, at least once a quarter if not more frequently as
circumstances require, and should disclose in the annual report the number of
board and committee meetings held in the year and the details of attendance of
each director (as applicable). Also important is the board definition of the levels
of materiality, reserving specific powers to its and delegating other matters with
the necessary written authority to management. These matters should be
monitored and evaluated on a regular basis (Creamer, 2000).
~ The Power of the Board
The board should have unrestricted access to all company information, records,
documents and property. The information needs of the board should have well
defined and regularly monitored. The board should consider developing
corporate code of conduct that addresses the conflicts of interests, particularly
relating to director and management, which should be regularly reviewed and
updated as necessary. The board should have an agreed procedure Whereby
directors may, if necessary, take independent professional advice at the
company's expense.
Efficient and timely methods should be determined for informing and briefing the
members prior to meetings while each board member is responsible for being
satisfied that, objectively, they have been furnished with all the relevant
information and facts before making a decision. Every board should consider
whether or not its size, diversity and demography make it effective. Non-
executive directors should have access to management and may even meet
separately with management, without the attendance of executive directors. This
should, however, be agreed collectively by the board usually facilitated by the
non- executive chairperson or lead independent non-executive directors. The
board should ensure that each item of special business included in the notice of
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annual general meeting, or any other shareowners' meeting, is accompanied by
a full explanation of the effects of any proposed resolutions 0Nard, 1997).
~ Transparency Issues
The board should encourage shareowners to attend annual general meetings,
which will enhance transparency. At this meeting the directors should present,
and more particularly the chairpersons of each of the board's committees-
especially the audit and remuneration committees. Also a brief Curriculum Vitae
of each director standing for election or re-election at the annual general meeting
should accompany the notice contained in the annual report. The board must
identify key risk areas and key performance indicators of the business enterprise.
These should be regularly monitored, with particular attention given to technology
and systems. The board should identify and monitor the non-financial aspects
relevant to the business of the company. The board should record the facts and
assumptions on which it relies to conclude that the business will continue as a
going concern in the financial year ahead or why it will not, and in that case, the
steps the board is taking. The board must find the correct balance between
conforming to governance constraints and performing in an entrepreneurial way.
There should be a clearly acc.epted division of responsibilities at the head of the
company to ensure a balance of power and authority, so that no one individual
has unfettered powers of decision-making (Spangeberg, Schroder and
Duvenage, 1999).
~ The Chairperson
The chairperson should preferably be an independent non-executive director.
Where the roles of the chair"person and chief executive officer are combined,
there should be either an independent non-executive director serving as deputy
chairperson or a strong independent. non-executive director element on the
board, and any such decision· to combine should be justified each year in the
company's annual report. The board should appraise the performance of the
chairperson on annual or such other basis as the board may determine
0Nessels, 1988).
~ The Roles of Chief Executive Officerl Chairperson
If the roles of chairperson and chief executive officer are combined, then the
independent deputy chairperson and maybe, two or more members drawn from
shareholder grouping or an independent pe[~on for. transparency and
._-------------------_._------~-----_.
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accountability must play a leading part in the evaluation. Given the strategic
operational role of the chief executive officer, these functions should be separate
from that of the chairperson. The chairperson, or a sub-committee appointed by
the board, should appraise the performance of the chief executive officer. The
board should satisfy itself that an appraisal of the chief executive is performed at
least annually. The result of such appraisal should also be considered by the
Remuneration Committee to guide it in its evaluation of the performance and the
remuneration of the chief executive officer. The board should ensure that there is
an appropriate balance of power and authority on the board, such that no one
individual or block of individual can dominate the board's decision taking
(Mbabane, 2000).
~ The Non-executive directors
The Non-executive directors should be individuals of calibre and credibility, and
have the necessary skills and experience to bring judgement to bear independent
of management, on issues of strategy, performance, resources, transformation,
diversity and employment equity, standard of conduct, and evaluation of
performance (Mbabane, 2000).
~ The annual reporting
In the annual report the capacity of the director should be categorized as follows:
Executive director- should be an individual that is involved in the day-to-day
management and/or is in full time salaried employment of the company and/or
any of its subsidiaries.
Non-executive director - should be an individual not involved in the day-to-day
management and not a full-time salaried employee of the company and its
subsidiaries. An individual in the full-time employment of the holding company or
of its subsidiaries, other than the company concerned, would also be considered
to be a non-executive director unless such individual by his/her conduct or
executive authority could be construed to be direct in the day-to-day
management of the company and its subsidiaries (Creamer, 2000).
Independent director - is a non-executive director who:
(i) Is not a representative of a shareowner who has the ability to control or
significantly influence management.
(ii) Has not been employed by the company or the group of which it currently
forms part, in any executive capacity for the preceding three financial years.
._~~---_.-----------~_.._--_._---~---------
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(Hi) Is not a member of the immediate family of an individual who is, or has been
in any of the past three financial years, employed by the company or the group in
an executive capacity.
(vi) Is not a professional advisor to the company or the group, other than in a
director capacity.
(v) Is not a significant supplier, or customer of the company or group,
(vi) Has no significant contractual relationship with the company or group; and
(vii) Is free from any business or other relationship which could be seen to
materially interfere with the individual's capacity to act in an independent manner
(Roberts, 1999).
A "shadow director" - should be considered to be a person in accordance with
whose directions or instructions (whether they extend over the whole of part of
the activities of the company), the directors of the company are accustomed to
act. Shadow directors should be encouraged.
Executive director - should be encouraged to hold other non-executive
directorships, only if they do not interfere with their immediate management
responsibilities.
Non-executive directors - should carefully consider limiting the number of
appointments they take in that capacity in order to ensure that the companies on
which they serve enjoy the full benefit of their expertise, experience and
knowledge.
Level of remuneration - should be sufficient to attract, retain and motivate
executive of the quality required by the board. The company - should appoint a
remuneration committee or such other appropriate board committee, consisting
entirely or mainly of independent non-executive directors, to make
recommendations to the board within agreed terms of reference on the
company's framework of executive remuneration and to determine specific
remuneration packages for each of the executive directors. This is ultimately, the
responsibility of the board. An independent non-executive director must chair this
committee. In order to obtain input on the remuneration of the other executives
the committee should consult the chief executive officer, who may attend the
meetings by invitation. However, a chief executive should play no part in
decisions regarding his/her own remuneration. Membership of the remuneration
committee or board committee that considers executive remuneration must be
-------------------
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disclosed in the annual report and the chairperson of such committee should
attend annual general meetings to answer any questions from shareowners
(King, 2002).
Companies - should provide full disclosure of directors remuneration on an
individual basis giving details of earning, share options, restraint payments and
all other benefits.
Performance related elements of remuneration - should constitute a substantial
portion of the total remuneration package of executives in order to align their
interests with shareowners, and should be designed to provide incentives to
perform at the highest operational standards.
Share options may be granted to non -executive directors but must be the
subject of prior approval of shareowners (usually at the annual general meeting)
having regard also to the specific requirements of the Companies Act. Because
of the apparent dilution of "independence", in some international markets the
view is that non-executive directors should preferably receive shares rather than
share options (Southey, 1999).
Allocation of share options
In regard to the allocation of share options, Boards should be mindful of the following:
• A vesting period in relation to the allocation of share options to non-executive
directors should be applied to dissuade short-term decision taking, but also have
regard to possibility or consequences of the removal or resignation of such
directors prior to the vesting period maturing and any perceived impact on their
independence
• Where it is proposed to re-price share options, this should be the subject of prior
shareowners approval. Details of the share options of each executive and non-
executive who stands to benefit from any such proposal should be provided and
should be subject to shareowner approval individual in respect of each director.
• If share options are to be issued, at a discounted ruling price, shareowners
should vote separately on this clause in the trust deed at the inception. Any
subsequent amendment's proposed to an existing trust deed, that would permit
allocation of these options at a discount, must be subject to the specific approval
of shareowners (Roberts, 1999).
Disclosure
The overriding principle of full disclosure by directors, on an individual basis, should
______apply to all share schemes_ and EllY-...9ther incentives scheme.s_p-rQR-o.se_d __by~ ~ _
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management. It is not considered appropriate, that an executive director's fixed-term
service contract, if any, should exist for three years. If so, full disclosure of this fact with
reasons should be given, and the consent of shareowners should be sought. Companies
should establish a formal and transparent procedure for developing in succession
learning, particularly in respect of the chief executive officer and executive mariagement.
Every listed company should have a practice prohibiting dealing in its security by
directors, officers and other selected employees for a designated period preceding the
announcement of its financial results or in any other period considered sensitive, have
regard to the listings requirements of the JSE in respect of dealings of directors. This
should be determined by way of a formal policy established by the board and
implemented by the company secretary.
Director Selection
Procedures for appointment to the board should be formal and transparent, and a matter
for the board as a whole, assisted where appropriate by a nomination committee. This
committee should constitute only non-executive director, of whom the majority should be
independent and be chaired by board chairperson. Board continuity, subject to the
performance and eligibility for re-election is imperative, programme ensuring a staggered
rotation of directors should be put in place by the board to the extent that this is not
already regulated (King 2002).
Induction and Orientation Programmes .
The board should establish a formal orientation programme to familiarize incoming
directors with the company's operations, senior management and its business
environment, and to induct them in their fiduciary duties and responsibilities. Directors
should receive further briefings from time to time on relevant new laws and regulations
as well as on changing commercial risk. New directors with no or limited board
experience should receive development and education to inform them of their duties,
responsibilities, powers and potential liabilities. The company secretary, in consultation
with the chairperson should play a substantial role in the orientation process for
directors, and in attending to any educational or development requirements. The board,
through the nomination committee or similar board committee, should regularly review its
required needs of skills and experience and other qualities such as its demographics
and diversity in order to assess the effectiveness of the board. This should be by means
of a self-evaluation of the board as well as whole, its committees and the contribution of
the each individual director King, 2002).
--- ..-~- -_._.._----------------- - ------------ .._----~--~---- ----_.----- ---
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Evaluations
The evaluations' should be conducted at least annually. Legislative changes are
recommended to buttress the existing provisions of the Companies Act regarding
directors' disqualification. Boards should ascertain whether potential new directors are fit
and proper and are not disqualified from being directors. Prior to their appointment,
these should be investigated along the lines of the approach required for listed
companies by the JSE or under the Banks Act, as appropriate. The nomination
committee will prove useful for this purpose. There should be a formal procedure for
certain functions of the board to be delegated, describing the extent of such delegation
to enable the board to properly discharge its duties and responsibilities and to effectively
fulfil its decision taking process. Board committees with formally determined terms of
reference, life span, role and function constitute an important element of this process
and should be established with clearly agreed upon reporting procedures and scope of
authority. As a general principle, there should be a transparency and full disclosure from
the board committee to the board, except where the board has mandated the committee
otherwise. At a minimum each board should have an audit and a remuneration
committee. Industry and company specific issues will dictate the requirements for other
committees ((Spangeberg, Schroder and Duvenage, 1999).
Board Committees.
Non-executive directors must play an important role in board committees. An
independent non-executive director should preferably chair' all board committees,
whether this is the board chairperson or some other appropriate individual. The
exception should be a board committee fulfilling an executive function. Board
committees should be free to take independent outside professional advice as when
necessary. Committee composition, a brief description of its remit, the number of
meetings held and other relevant information should be disclosed in the annual report.
The chairpersons of the board committees, particularly those in respect of audit,
remuneration, should attend the company's annual general meeting. Board committees
should be subject to regular evaluation by the board to ascertain their performance and
effectiveness. The Standing Advisory on Company Law should investigate whether there
is a need for the rule "business judgment rule "in South Africa.
Company Secretary
The board should be cognizant of the duties imposed upon the company secretary and
should empower the company secretary accordingly to enable him or her to properly
fulfil those duties. In addition to extensive statutory duties, the company secretary must
--- ----------
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provide the board as a whole and directors individually with details and guidance as to
how their responsibilities should be properly discharged in the best interest of the
company. The company secretary has an important role in the induction of new or
inexperienced directors, and in assisting the chairperson and chief executive officer in
determining the annual board plan and the administration of other issues of a strategy
nature at the board level. The company secretary should provide a central source of
guidance and advice to the board, and within the company, on matters of ethics and
good govemance. The company secretary should be subjected to a fit and proper test in
the same manner as is recommended for new director appointments.
Management of Risk
The board has the responsibility to ensure that the company has implemented an
effective ongoing process to identify risk, to measure its potential impact against board
set of assumptions, and then to activate what is necessary to proactively manage those
risks. Risk management and internal control should be practiced throughout the
company by all staff, and should be embedded in day-to-day activities. The board should
make use of generally recognized risk management and internal control models and
frameworks in order to maintain a sound system of risk management and internal control
to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of organizational objectives
with respect to:
• The effectiveness and efficiency of operation,
• The safeguarding of the company's assets (including information);
• Compliance with applicable laws; regulation and supervisor requirements;
• Supporting business sustainability under normal as well as adverse operating
conditions;
• The reliability of reporting; and
• Behaving responsibility towards all stakeholders (Roberts, 1999).
Risk should not only be viewed from a negative perspective. The review process
identifies areas of opportunity, such as where effective risk management can be turned
to competitive advantage. The board is responsible for the total process of risk
management, as well as for forming its own opinion on the effectiveness of the process.
Management is accountable to the board for designing, implementing and monitoring the
process of risk management, and integrating it into the day-to-day activities of the
company. The board should set the risk strategy policies with the executive directors and
senior management. These policies should be clearly communicated to all employees to
______~n~ur.!Lth~UhJL.d~_~rategY..i~--i.!lCPJp-OJ..ated~nto-the-laoguag ..e_aocL_cultur:e__oLthe _
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company. The board is responsible for ensuring that a systematic, documented
assessment of the processes outcomes surrounding of key risk is undertaken at least
annually for the purposes of making its public statement on risk management. It should,
at appropriately considered intervals, receive the review reports on the risk management
process in the company. This risk assessment should address the company's exposure
to at least the following:
• Physical and operational risk
• Human resource risk
• Technology risk
• Business continuity and disaster recovery
• Credit and market risk
• Compliance risks (Southey, 1990)
A board' committee, either a dedicated committee or one with other responsibilities,
should be appointed to assist the board in reviewing the risk management process and
the significant risk facing the company. The board is responsible for disclosure in relation
to risk in the annual report and should acknowledge that it is accountable for the risk
management procedures. The internal audit function should not assume the function,
systems and processes of risk management, but should be used to provide independent
assurance in relation to management's assertions surrounding the effectiveness of risk
management and internal control. If a compliance function exists it will provide
assurance in relation to compliance with applicable laws, regulations and supervisor
requirement. The board to ensure that risks are mitigated and that the company's
objectives are attained should establish a comprehensive system of control. The control
environment should also set the tone of the company and cover ethical values,
management's philosophy and the competence of employees. Risks should be
assessed on an on-going basis, and control activities should be designed to respond to
risks throughout the company. Pertinent information arising from the risk assessment,
and relating to control activities, and should be identified, captured and communicated in
a form and timeframe that enables employees to carry out their responsibilities properly.
Both line management and assurance providers should monitor these controls.
Companies should develop a system of risk management and internal control that builds





This chapter focuses on the King's report recommendations as well as the functions of
the board of directors, the roles of different components within the board, such as chief
executive, the non-executive director, etc. The recommendations of the Kings report on
the composition and functions of the board of directors are presented and discussed
within the context of the composition and effectiveness of the board of directors in South
Africa. This contextual presentation lead to the following method of collecting data and
the actual case history used in this research project.






The King's report recommendation on board of directors gives guidelines not only to
private organizations' board of directors but also to parastatals and public organizations.
Literature reviewed showed that there are a number of issues around the functions of
the board of directors and its units, which need to be looked at especially within board of
directors in South Africa. It is, therefore, important that a survey that analyses selected
cases of the board of directors are selected in order to gather data for this study on the
effectiveness of the board of directors. The King's Report recommendations serve as a
guide in the data collection and in the data analysis. The method of data collection,
sampling and data analysis is further discussed in the following sections.
3.2 CASE STUDY RESEARCH METHOD
This research used a case stUdy approach to collect data that answer the critical
questions of this research. This research approach is relevant because the aims of this
research focuses on an in-depth analysis of the board of directors be it in a parastatal,
public organization and! or private organization. The method of data collection and
analysis conducted involves three cases analysis:
• Collecting data on specific cases
• Conducting data analysis
• Concluding and making recommendations
The advantage of this method, particularly in this study, is that:
~ The King's report recommendations will be looked at by directors
serving in different boards and thus the findings will be relevant
and applicable to different board of directors.
~ The other advantage is that the five selected companies are
different and therefore, their responses can enable them to
reorganise their boards and implement some of King's report
recommendations.
~ The researcher in this study has the been serving in different
boards and thus formulating a case study was due to this
__________ c_~~ ~~ ~~~0\'Vle~e_~bout dif!ere:.~~~~ar~sin South Africa.
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The researcher should know and understand well the research parameters, research
units and area of research, especially when a case study method is used (Kumar, 2000).
This allows the researcher to get a better idea about the relevant sources of information.
The researcher's involvement in different board of directors ensures maximum support
by all respondents who were included in data gathering. The next section covers ethical
guidelines, sampling procedures, research instruments, data collection and the data
analysis method.
3:2.1 ETHICAL GUIDELINES
Ethical standards were maintained through out this study. The following ethical
guidelines will be adhered to:
~ The researcher ensured that members of the board of directors who were part of
the study were protected from any harm.
~ The board of directors taking part in the study were informed about all the
aspects of this study that might influence their willingness to take part.
~ The researcher ensured that the study of the link between the composition of the
board of directors and effectiveness does not take advantage of the participants.
~ All the members of the board of directors who were participating in this study
were treated with respect and concern for their well-being.
~ Information gathered on this study was treated confidentially and used for
research purposes only.
3.2.2 SAMPLING PROCEDURE
The sample was drawn from the KwaZulu-Natal Headquarter Companies. The sample
parameters included two of the following;
• Municipal funded entity
• Parastatal
• Listed conglomerate
• Unlisted private company
• Black economic empowerment company
The sample units include a minimum of two directors and maximum of 5 from each
sample parameter. i.e. from each selected category. The characteristics for selecting
respondents included racial and gender. Over and above the respondents selected from
each selected category of companies a sample of 12 respondents (minimum) was
selected randomly from a pool of leading directors in South Africa based in KZN
Province. These are as follows:
-- ---- --------------------- ---------------~----------------------
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.• 2 Black Female Directors
• 2 White Female Directors
• 2 Black Male Directors
• 2 Coloured Male Directors
• 2 Indian Male Directors
• 2 White Male Directors
These directors have already been identified. The sample is such that in our analysis we
would be able to detect any variations and differences between the four major
categories. Each grouping (between parastatals, unlisted, listed, municipal entity and
black economic entity and/or within each one of them). Due to time constraints one
company was chosen from each sector and/or segment.
3.2.3 RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS
The research instruments used in this study include:
3.2.4 QUESTIONNAIRES
The questionnaires in this study reliantly and validly discriminate between the
composition of the board of directors and their effectiveness. The closed-ended
questions provided alternatives that the respondent could select from, when responding.
This allowed speedy responses. The open-ended questions provided the respondent
with an opportunity to clarity his / her choices. The advantage of open-end questions in
this study is that they allow participants to prOVide a wide range of detailed responses
and also permit a researcher to potentially discover many relevant attitudes, and
experiences that may confound the results. The advantage of using a questionnaire in
this study is that it reduces reactivity and social desirability. This is due to the fact that
completing a questionnaire anonymously is less threatening than talking to another
person. Questionnaires in this study provide more efficient data collection, because most
respondents can complete at one time. Questionnaires are also used in this study
because they are less expensive and have an added advantage of taking less time to
collect.
3.2.5 INTERVIEWS
A follow up interviews were used in this study to ensure that the respondents get a
chance to express their thoughts openly with justifications where necessary. This
allowed the interviewer to react to the information provided by a respondent, by either
requesting clarity or exploring additional, unanticipated topics brought up by the
respondent.
._-----~----------------------- .--~--------- ------_._----_.~----~----_..~.- --
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3.2.6 DATA COLLECTION PLAN
Cooperation and support of the Chairpersons of relevant of Board of Directors was
sought. The permission of the directors identified in the sample was obtained. They were
briefed about the study. Their informed consent was obtained in written form. The study
took five months to complete. The follow up interviews were conducted with a group of
selected members of the board of directors. Questionnaires were distributed to members
of the board of directors.
3.2.7 DATA ANALYSIS METHOD
Data on questionnaires were analysed using a statistical techniques. Data from focus
interviews was analysed using content analysis method. Data from focus interviews
were further analysed using theme analysis.
3.3 THE CASE· DOCUMENT ANALYSIS
The document analysis conducted in this section included the data from parastatals,
listed conglomerate, private, unlisted, black economic empowerment companies and
municipal entities.
(i) PARASTATAL
The structure of the board in the parastatal has 16 members who serve as the
Accounting Authority. The exco has 5 members including the chairperson. In the
parastatal the government appoints the board members to represent the interest
of the customers and stakeholders. The board members meet monthly. The
position of a chairperson of the board and that of the chief executive officer are
separate. The board structure reflects 25% women representatives and 75%
men representatives. The exco members are 100% men. The racial
representation reflects the demographics of South Africa. The period of term for
board members is 5 years. The comparative analysis of the board in a 5 year
period before the current board's 5 year term, show that there was an increase of
essential services whereas in the last 5 year period indicates a decline in service
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(ii) PRIVATE LISTED (Conglomerate)
The structure of the board in private listed companies has 19 members. The exco
has 10 members. Out of the 21 board members, there are 10 non-executive
board members. The position of a chairman is alternated between two persons.
In private companies the directors are appointed by the shareholders to
represent the interest of the shareholders. The board members meet five times a
year. The board members are provided outside professional advice whenever
they need it. The position of a chairperson of the board and that of the chief
executive officer used to be one, until very recently. The exco members are
100% men and these are managing directors of subsidiaries and executive
directors representing support services such as human resources corporate
affairs etc. the sub-committees of the board include the following: -
)0 Executive Committee
)0 Audit and Compliance Committee
)0 Remuneration Committee
)0 Employment Equity Committee
(iii) MUNICIPAL ENTITY
The structure of the board in the municipal entity has 13 members. There is an
executive committee. Out of the 13 board members, the position of a chairperson
and that of the chief executive officer are separate. The board members meet
quarterly. The sub-committees meet monthly. The racial representation reflects
the demographics of South Africa. The period of term for board members is 1




)0 Human Resources Committee
(iv) PRIVATE UNLISTED
The board consists of 9 members. This company has more sub-committees than
any other company in our sample. It goes beyond the requirements of the King 11
Report. Some of these innovative and uncommon sub-committees include
procurement, corporate governance, government affairs and foreign
opportunities committees. The position of chief executive and chair combined
into one person who happens to the major shareholder. The board meets
- -- - -- -~------------ - ------~-- ---- ------------ ----------- -----------~---------~-+--------~--- - -------
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quarterly. The demographic reality is not reflected in the board as Indians
represent the dominant component.
(v) BLACK ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT COMPANIES
The structure of the board in black empowerment companies has 7 members.
There is no executive committee. Out of the 7 board members, the position of the
chairperson, managing director and company secretary are separated. In black
empowerment companies the directors are appointed by the shareholders to
represent the interest of the shareholders. The board members meet regularly,
once a month. The position of a chairperson of the board and' that of the
managing director are not the same. The racial representation do not reflects the
demographics of South Africa. The period of term for board members is 1 year.
The board is limited to 7 members and the board assumes all responsibilities of
the relevant sub-committees.
3.3.1 The identification of the Companies in the Sample;
Company A - National Parastatal
Company B - Black Economic Empowerment Company
Company C - Unlisted Private Company
Company D - Municipal Entity
Company E - Listed Private Corporation (Conglomerate)
3.3.2 Structure of the Board
Company A B C* 0 E
Subcommittees
Executive X " X ~Audit ..; X ..; X ..;
Finance ..; X ..; ..;
Remuneration ..; X ..; X
Human Resources X X X
Employment Equity X X ..; X ..;
Nomination X X X X X
Investment X X " X XPublic Affairs X X ..; X X
Transformation ..; X X X
Marketing X X ..; X
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3.3.3 Size of the Board
Size Companies
Number of members A B C 0 E
1 to 5
5 to 10 ..J "10 to 15 "15 to 20 " "20 plus
3.3.4 - Directors
(i) Executive versus Non-Executive Directors
Type Companies
Number of members A B C 0 E
Executive 1 1 4 1 9
Non-Executive 15 6 5 12, 10
Total 16 7 9 13 19
.
(ii) Split between inside and totally Independent non-executlve (outside
director)
Type Companies
Non-executive directors A B C 0 E
Inside - 4 - 4 7
Outside 15 2 5 8 3
Total 15 6 5 12 10
3.3.5 (i) Chairperson and Chief Executive positions
Nature Companies
A B C D E
Combined "Separate ..J " " "
3.3.6 (ii) Tenure of Office of Chair I CEO
The term of office of both chairperson and CEO in all companies in the sample is not
limited except company A (the parastatal) and Company D (Unicity entity) where the two
positions of CEO are contractual but renewable based on performance. Whilst the
position of Chairs in these two latter companies is based on statutory limitations at the
-- _.~-- -------- ------._.._-
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end of the term of office the responsible ministry in the case of the parastatal and by
cabinet sanction - the incumbent may be reappointed. With regards to the municipality
entity the chair is appointed by the board, which is strongly influenced by board .
members representing the municipality executive committee (the shareholder in this
instance).
3.3.7 Selection of Directors
Selection Guidelines Companies
A B C D E
Exist (formalised) ..J
Non-existent ..J ..J ..J ..J
No formal selection gUIdelines and/or procedures eXist but normally when a vacancy
occurs any director may nominate and/or suggest, notably chairs play a prominent part
including non-executive directors representing shareholders.
3.3.8 Formal Induction of Directors
Induction Companies
Programming
A B C D E
Exist (formalised)
Non-existent " ..J " " ..J
3.3.9 Composition by Gender
Company Companies
A B C D E
Female 5 2 1 3 2
Male 11 5 8 10 17
Total 16 7 9 13 19
- In Company A, all women are Black and 1 out of the total of five is not African
but Indian.
- In Company B all women are African.
-In Company E the split is 50% African and 50% White.
- In Company C the female is African.
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3.3.10 Composition by Race
Company Companies
Racial Group A 8 C D E
African 9 7 3 6 2
Indian 3 - 5 1 1
Coloured - - - - -
White 4 - 1 6 16
Total 16 7 9 13 19
3.3.11 Evaluation of Board Members
In all the 5 companies there was no formal evaluation or/and performance appraisal of
the individual board members or the board as a collective.
3.4 Conclusion:
The quantitative and qualitative approach used in this study gives an advantage
because it is a small sample that needs thorough data analysis. Data collection method
shows that the respondents were given questionnaires, then follow-up interviews were
also conducted, this allowed the researcher to gather as much as possible. Document
analysis provided information on unlisted, listed, parastal, black economic empowerment
company and municipal entity. The analysis of data yielded valuable information that is
interrogated and presented in the next chapter. Issues revolving around the skills profile,
expertise, experience, selection of directors, number of boards in which they serve, their
compensation and remuneration, perceptions and views on Corporate Governance
Reports such as King I1 Report and functioning of board sub-committees will be dealt
with in the next chapter. The next chapter 4 will focus on the findings of the survey,
inclUding the critical evaluation of these findings against our Model in Chapter 2





The results of this research are presented according to the data collected through the
investigation conducted as indicated in the previous chapter. The results were carefully
and systematically executed, according to the plan of data collection and analysis, in
order to derive valid conclusions about the findings. The results, in this study are
consistently presented in the following format: The characteristics of the sample units
are presented first, then the aims of the study which are presented, followed by a table
and I or figure and the description of the tablel figure. The data sources were archives
primary data sources. The latter, consisted of all directors of the boards.
4.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF DATA SOURCES
The data sources consisted of the archives and primary data sources. The
characteristics are as follows:
Table 4.1: Characteristics of the archives.
NATURE OF ARCHIVE CONTENT SPECIFICATIONS
Parastatals Board structure and Board sub-committees
composition
Private listed company Board structure and Board sub-committees
composition
Unicity Entity Board structure and .Board sub-committees
composition
Black economic Board structure and Board sub-committees
empowerment company composition
Private unlisted company Board structure and Board sub-committees
composition
Table 4.1 shows that document reviewed were those from parastatals, private listed
company, unicity entity, private unlisted and black economic empowerment company.
The focus was on board structure and composition as well as board sub-committees.
-- ._-----------_._-_._.__._----------
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Table 4.4 shows that, 12% of respondents were between the ages 16-25 years, 8%
were between the ages of 26-35 years, 24% were between the ages of 36-45 years,
44% were between the ages of 46-55 years and 12% were 56 years and above.
Table 4.5: Characteristics of primary respondents according to experience
as a director.
Experience in years Frequencies Percentage
1-5 years 7 28%
6-10 years 8 32%
11 years and above 10 40%
Table 4.5 shows that, most (40%) respondents had an experience as board directors for
11 years and above, other 28% had 1-5 years and 32% 6-10 years experience.
Table 4.6: Characteristics of primary respondents according to marital
status
Marital status Frequency Percentages




Table 4.6 shows that, most (88%) respondents were married, 8% were divorced and the
other 4% never married.
Table 4.7: Characteristics of primary respondents according to types of
sector they serve as directors




Table 4.7 shows that, most (64%) respondents serve in a private sector, 16% served in
public sector and 20% serve in parastatals.
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Table 4.8: Characteristics of primary respondents according to the number
of board of directors they serve
Number of Boards Frequency Percentages
1-2 Boards 4 16%
3-5 Boards 9 36%
6-10 Boards 10 40%
11 Boards and above 2 8%
Table 4.8 shows that, 16% of respondents serve in 1-2 boards, 36% serve in 3-5 boards,
40% serve in 6-10 boards and 8% serve in 11 or more boards.
Table 4.9: Characteristics of primary respondents according to the size of
the Board they serve in.
Size of the Board Frequency Percentages
1-5 Members 2 8%
5-10 Members 7 28%
10-15 Members 11 44%
15-20 Members 5 20%
20 Members & Above 0 0%
Table 4.9 shows that, 8% of respondents serve in boards a with 1-5 members, 28%
serve in boards with 5-10 members, 44% serve in boards with 10-15 members and 20%
serve in boards with 15-20 members.
4.3 KING 11 REPORT ON CORPORATE GOVERANCE
THEME A: AWARENESS OF THE KING 11 REPORT.
All respondents, (100%) were aware of the King 11 Report, without exception.
THEME B: IMPRESSIONS OR/AND VIEWS ON THE REPORT
Whilst, all respondents regarded the Kings 11 Report as a positive development, 2% had
some reservations about it. (This will be alluded to, elsewhere in our report). However,
the positive aspects revolve around the following;
o Directors accountability has been given new meaning
o Transparency and disclosure
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o Good corporate governance guidelines and sound principles in the
role, responsibilities and expectations of directors.
o Importance of the triple bottom-line concept, which in the long run, it is
believed, will ensure sustainability of the business.
o Establishes sound foundation upon which individual companies can
build
o Provides sound objective framework within which to build.
In summary: -
70% of the respondents felt that the report enhances the understanding of the directors'
role and responsibilities.
70% believed that it gives real meaning to directors' accountability to shareholders.
90% thought it laid firm foundation for good corporate guidelines and 25% said it made
good business sense.
50% of respondents (all of them, from the previously disadvantaged group) thought that
the triple bottom-line concept advocated in the report encourages responsibility to the
environment, social and well-being of overall society.
60% of the respondents said it gives credence to the need for effective boards through
the establishment and utilisation of the board committee system.
THEME C: CRITICAL FEATURES
The respondents identified the following as the critical elements of the King 11 Report:
o Transparency and accountability
o Directors remuneration
o Risk management and internal control
o Role of non-executive and executive directors
o In line with international benchmarks - critical for investor confidence
o Business ethics and organisational integrity
THEME 0: - ACCEPTANCE
All respondents accepted the King 11 Report and would recommend it to their boards to
embrace and implement it.
5% of the respondent's boards had already accepted and implemented the King 11
Report.
THEME E: - CRITICISM OF THE REPORT
14% of the respondents felt that the report was too onerous placing much demand on
non-executive directors who were not involved in day-to-day operations. Related to this,
is that non-executive directors are given too much accountability and exertive liabilities.
-- - ---- ._-------._.-._-------_._~----------_._-_.- ----_._-------------- '~~-'
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71% of those who felt that the report was onerous, thought that levels of responsibility
should be guided by the size of the company, either measured in terms of assets,
turnover or/and profit. Blanket approach would negatively impact on small medium sized
enterprises. 10% of the respondents felt that it might be easier for larger companies to
implement, than small to medium sized companies. These might find it expensive to
implement.
15% of the respondents - (entirely previously disadvantaged individuals) felt that it was
rather radical and may not exactly be suitable for a developing country especially on the
part of non -executive directors.
THEME F: KINGS REPORT ON SELECTION OF DIRECTORS
All respondents were in agreement with Kings 11 Report recommendations on the
selection guidelines for directors.
o Procedures for appointments to the board should be formal and transparent,
and a matter for the board as a whole, assisted where appropriate by a
nomination committee. This committee should constitute only non-executive
directors of whom the majority should be independent, and chaired by the
board chairperson.
o Board continuity, subject to performance and eligibility for re-election, is
imperative and a programme ensuring a staggered rotation of directors
should be put in place by the board to the extent where affected companies
incorporated under the Companies Act do not already regulate this.
o The board to familiarise incoming directors with the company's operations,
senior management and its business environment and to induct them in their
fiduciary duties and responsibilities should establish a formal orientation
programme.
o Directors should receive further briefings from time to time, on relevant new
laws and regulations and changing commercial risks.
o New directors with no or limited board experience, should receive training in
their unaccustomed responsibility, which carries with it potential personal
liability.
o The company secretary, in consultation with the chairperson, should play a
substantial role in the orientation process for directors and in attending to any
training or development requirements.
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THEME G: - THE STATUS OF THE COMPANIES IN OUR SAMPLE IN RELATION TO
KINGS 11 REPORT
Parastatal - Company A
Corporate governance is not only embraced but, being fully implemented. The King 11
Report is currently being implemented in all respects. However, in the 2000 - 2001
Financial Year, the company covers all aspects of the organisation and including the key
tenets of the latest in corporate governance. These include:
o Code of ethics
o Going concern
o Internal control
o Policies, objectives and performance measurement
o Strategic planning
o Risk management
o Public finance management act (PFMA)
o Employment equity
o Governance structures
o Sub-committees of the board which is in line with King 1I Report
Ongoing assessment in line with the requirements of a highly dynamic environment is in
vogue, Le. continuous review of the structures.
Black Economic Empowerment Company - Company B
Clearly, from the Annual Report of Company B - Kings I Report has been embraced, in
all respects, except the board sub-committee structure. As indicated in Chapter 3, they
only have an executive committee, which deals with all the functions of the audit, and
remuneration committees. Their argument is that their board, which consists of 7
members, acts as an executive committee and meets once a month in that capacity. Its
size gives it an added advantage and dimension, as it involves all board members in
detailed discussions pertaining to issues of audit and remuneration or any other
important aspect of board business, which, is normally deferred to various board sub-
committees in large sized boards.
The position of chairman and CEO are separate. It is however, significant to note that,
the CEO is the founder and the major shareholder in the group. The chairman is also a
shareholder in the company, to a far lesser degree than the founder. 71 % of the
directors are shareholders in the company. The question that arises is, whether this
company is geared to deal with all the implications of King 11 Report:
58
o Is the non-executive chairman really independent?
o Can he succumb or withstand any pressure or undue demands from the founder
and CEO?
o King 11 report insists on audit and remuneration board committees. Is this a
luxury they can do without?
o Would non-compliance with the King 11 Report structures prejudice the company
in its drive to attract more private black shareholders?
The founder and CEO views on King 11 Report are very succinct "It is a step in the right
direction. If all recommendations were implemented great progress, stability and
confidence would be achieved."
PRIVATELY OWNED - UNLISTED - COMPANY C
In the words of the founder, chairman and CEO of the company - who owns more than
60% of the holding company - expressing his sentiments on King 11 Report says: "In
view of events of corporate non-compliance worldwide the King IJ Report on corporate
govemance recommendations will help build confidence in the South African Corporate."
Whilst this company is the only one in our sample that has a combined chairman/CEO
position - it has more board sub-committees than any of the companies in our sample,
beyond the requirements of any corporate governance report orland dictum, as indicated
in Chapter 3.
Some of the questions that arose for Company B are as relevant as ever in the case of
this privately owned but, unlisted company.
It is interesting to note that both Company B (Black Empowerment) and Company C
(Private unlisted) are not listed. Clearly, if and when they list, it would be in their interest
to conform to the requirements of the King 11 Report. We need to point out however, that
to-date, they have complied with all material aspects of the King I1 Report, although
some of the requirements are not listing prerequisites or/and find expression in law. For
them, they seem to be even ahead, not only of their peers, but some big tested
"brothers' or "sisters" who are listed.
CITY ENTITY - COMPANY D
Company D, whilst alluding and expressing positive sentiments about the need for good
corporate governance, indications are that in terms of board committees it is lacking.
Whilst, the human resources committee deals with all issues pertaining to remuneration,
there is no audit committee. However, it has been said that the finance committee deals












even in its first report - Kings Committee advanced sound arguments for such
committee as a separate entity, from finance or investment committees, if the audit
committee is not separate from the finance committee. Matters and issues seem to get
clouded and confused resulting in audit issues remaining in the periphery, if not
compromised.
The audit committee is responsible mainly for oversight of the corporations or company's










These are very specific duties, which should not be confused with other financial and/or
investment issues.
It is however, noteworthy that Company 0 as a public corporation, whose sole and main
shareholder is government at local level - has to meet and satisfy other charters and/or
Acts of Parliament, rules and regulations which are more demanding which govern these
entities. These include for example, Public Finance Management Act, the Municipal
Finance Management Bill that is under discussion in parliament currently.
It's also noteworthy that, the position of chairman and CEO are separate in this
company. As indicated in Chapter 3, non-executive directors are in the majority, a
manifestation of Kings 11 Report recommendations.
LISTED PRIVATE CORPORATION - COMPANY E
A leading company in the sphere of its operations, which has complied with the code of
corporate practises and conduct (King I Report on Corporate Governance). The
company goes further in its Annual Report 2001 published early this year confirms that,
independent auditors have verified compliance with King I Report.
This compliance finds expression in that the CEO and chairman positions have been
separated. Further manifestation of this compliance and endorsement of effective
corporate governance, as advocated in Kings Report, are found in the board and
~=- ~--"-~--- --------------~-
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committee structures, audit and compliance committee, which consist of all independent
non- executive directors.
The remuneration committee consists of 40% of executive directors and 60% of non-
executive directors. What is significant with the membership of both the audit and
remuneration committees is that, whilst non-executive directors comprises the majority
of these two committees, inside non-executive directors seem to dominate. In the
instance of the remuneration committee, the ratio is 2: 1 in favour of inside non-
executives. Although, in the audit and compliance committee the ratio is 2:2. Two of the
non-executive directors in this board are executive directors of the holding company,
which owns more than 50% of Company E. The questions that arise are;
o Firstly, how independent are they?
o Secondly, the non-executive chairman is· the immediate past CEO of the
company. Is it desirable or not to have the immediate past CEO remaining as a
non-executive director, after his retirement as CEO, let alone, becoming the next
non-executive chairman?
Whilst, both King I and 11 Report do not address themselves to these questions, these
are issues that can no longer be ignored in the critical evaluation of board composition
and effectiveness.
The company has committed itself to considering the recommendations of the second
King Report with the intention of taking appropriate compliance action.
4.4 COMPOSITION OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS
THEME A - STRUCTURE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
It is true that it cannot be gainsaid, that companies in general particularly publicly owned
corporations (listed companies) employ diverse approaches to board structure and
operations and no one structure is right for every company and/or corporation?
SUB THEME (I) SIZE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Board of directors vary in size from industry to industry, and company to company. In
determining the board size, directors should consider the nature, size and complexity of
the business, as well as, the stage of its development. Scholars and experts in
corporate governance, tend to agree that smaller boards are often more cohesive and
work more effectively than larger boards.
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Our research suggests, that the board size should be dependent on the needs and
nature of the business in which the company operates. 80% of the respondents agreed
with this view. In terms of actual numbers in the board of directors;
o 8 - 10 member boards were preferred by 65% of the respondents
o 7 - 10 member boards were preferred by 45% of the respondents
o 25% of the respondents preferred boards with 10 -12 members
o 8% of the respondents thought 15 member boards should be the norm allowing
for balance of skills, racial demographic reflection and gender equity ratio.
What was very striking is that without exception, smaller boards are seen to be ideal
because they provide;
o Robust discussion and debate
o Effective decision making
o Lean and mean boards - meaning speed of decision-making.
Furthermore, directors who served in private unlisted companies favoured smaller and
leaner boards whereas those in publicly owned listed companies tended to aggravate to
12 - 15 member boards. Whether there is a correlation between the size of board and
it's listing or unlisted status, is a question that needs further examination. One leading
director who serves in a number of publicly owned corporations and on multi-national
said, "For large national or international businesses, and for the balance of skills, and
allowing for variety, breadth and depth of views and experience, it is unlikely or doubtful,
that the board can be less than 15 members".
The question of uneven and even numbers was raised by 8% of the directors -
irrespective of the total number of members in the board. 4% of the respondents
thought uneven numbers lent themselves to effectiveness as they prevented deadlocks.
The balance of 4% thought even numbers encouraged consensus. A cursory look on
the companies in our sample indicates that all boards except, company A had uneven
numbers.
Company A - 16
Company B-7
Company C - 9
Company 0 - 13
Company E - 19
Is this a coincidence or deliberate. We are unable to answer, but it may be in line with
the position taken by the 4% of the sample that favours uneven numbers.
~~~ ~~~------- ----------------------------------
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It is also interesting to note that privately owned - unlisted companies in our sample had
less than 10 members. This seems to be in line with the theory of the evolution of the
board and stage of development. Whereas, the publicly owned (listed Company E) and
parastal (Company A) had more than 15 members. The city entity has 13 - more than
10, but less than 15. Is there any visible andlor credible rationale to this state of affairs?
The further question that arises is - Is the nature of ownership related to the size of the
board? Research done in UK and USA seem to confirm this, that, boards start small
and the business grows, becoming compl~x and board numbers expand too.
Furthermore, what are the implications of the need and Kings requirement to have more
non-executive directors than executive directors? In short, what impact doeslmight or
could, non-executive directors have upon the size of the board, and what would be the
advantages and disadvantages of smaller or larger number of directors?
The optimum size of the board depends upon the circumstances of the company, the
qualities of directors and how the business of the board is conducted (Coulson Thomas
1993). In concurring, one of the leading authorities in board size and effectiveness -
Alan Wakelan in his paper 1991 titled "The Effective Board: Current Practises, Myths,
and realities for the UK Institute of Directors" says, "Whether or not a board of a certain
size is effective will depend upon a number of factors such as, composition and
dynamics, the personalities of its members, its priorities, qualities of the chairmanship
and how the business of the board is managed. When assessing the impact of board
size upon its effectiveness, these other influences and considerations will need to be
taken into account."
SUB-THEME (ii) CHAIRMAN I CEO
There has been a great deal of debate about the desirability of separating the roles of
CEO and chairman. Our research indicated that, in most respondent boards (88%), the
position of the chairman was separate from that of the chief executive i.e. individual
directors in our sample (not necessarily those representing the companies in our
sample). However, even those representing the companies in the sample, concur with
this view. Some of the rationale advanced for the separation, is in line with Kings 11
Report motivation in this respect. Most respondents echoed the words of John
Whitehead a leading director in US who said, "One man rule is a bad idea. A single
CEO-Chairman can do great damage before being reigned in - often when it is too late
or almost too late" when they said " It· is not healthy to give too much power to one
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individual. The question of accountability becomes an issue and before you know you
have a disastrous dictator in your midst"
It is striking that in the instance of these positions being combined - historical reasons
were highlighted and this tended to be located in the privately owned unlisted
companies. (Company C) In the instance of Company E, the position had just been
split to accommodate King 11 report although a further question arises.
Is it healthy for an immediate past CEO, who has just retired, to become the chairman?
Is it in fact, desirable that, he or she even remains in the board as a non-executive
director? Does this not stifle and hinder the new CEO, who might have to look over his
shoulder, especially, if the new chairman is overbearing and still unconsciously believes
that he is still in charge, as a CEO? This area needs further research.
All the companies in our sample as already indicated in Chapter 3 - the position of
chairman and CEO were separate and held by two different individuals, except in
Company C - the privately owned - unlisted company.
SUB-THEME (iii) - CHIEF EXECUTIVE TENURE OF OFFICE
Should the term of office of the chief executive be limited to a fixed period or not?
Our research findings show a clear divide between non-executive and executive
directors on this question. Executive directors were unanimous in their view that the
term of office should be unlimited. Their assertion was based on the fact that the board
has the power to fire the CEO at anytime if the circumstances demanded. They also felt
that, if the CEO is constantly delivering and adding value to shareholders, there was no
need to limit the term of office depriving the company and the board immense value.
The term of office should depend entirely on performance and track record. Continuity
was also strongly highlighted. However, non-executive directors were of different view,
advocating for a fixed term of office, although non-executive directors who previously
served as CEO's tended to be symp.~thetic with the views of executive directors on this
issue. These sympathetic non-executive directors thought that CEO's term of office
should be guided by proper performance evaluation and reward as part of their review.
Tenure being determined by this review rather than a fixed contract. Parastatals and
municipal entities CEO's terms of office seem to be determined by fixed term contract
renewable on the basis of performance. This was the case with Company A and D in
our sample. In Company B, C and E the CEO's did not have any fixed term of office, but
were subject to board evaluation and review.
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The question that arises is whether performance evaluation of a CEO, who is a major
shareholder, can really result in him or her being fired by the board if he/she is not
performing. Is this really possible in Company Band C, where the CEO holds more than
50% of equity? It was very interesting to note that non-executive directors appointed by
the state or municipality, opted very strongly for fixed term contract that was renewable
for the CEO. Other non-executive directors felt that the term should be fixed. 60% of
these respondents felt that 4 - 6 years was an appropriate term of office for the CEO.
30% of these thought 7 - 10 years were most relevant. 10% believing that 3 years was
enough.
A whole range of reasons were advanced such as:
o To encourage healthy and constructive competitive spirit amongst top
management, which would be compromised if CEO's term was unlimited
o It encourages effective succession planning which is a great morale
booster to those below CEO level.
o To allow for good planning and continuity - a sound corporate
governance principles to prevent abuse of power as well as to allow for a
fresh perspective
o The company needs change of leadership, injection of new blood,
experience and growth
o If the term is not limited it is complacency that sets in, but also stale
thinking, same approach, too much confidence and one individual can
become too powerful.
It is believed that the issue should not be confined to CEO's term of office being fixed or
not. We believe it should go beyond that, if it is related to the effectiveness of the
boards. The question that becomes relevant is - should the retiring CEO remain in the
board as a non-executive director after relinquishing the position of the CEO?
There seems to be clear advantages and disadvantages on the issue of the presence of
former CEO's on boards of companies in which they served as CEO's.
Key relationships, deep insight into the markets and operations of the company,
understanding of customers, suppliers investors are some of the advantages highlighted.
Historical knowledge - "Institutional memory is available to the board and benefits of
continuity maximised" (Bowden 1994).
However, scholars and practitioners in this field feel that there are more compelling





Arguments advanced against continuing service include:
o It makes it clear to everyone that the new CEO is in fact now in charge and
fully accountable
With the best intention in the world it is very difficult for many former CEO's to
be entirely objective about decisions made on their watch.
Emotional issues - personal loyalty to the former CEO will inevitably make it
difficult for board members to reverse some of the former CEO decisions in
their presence, especially if they remain friends.
The new CEO might be intimidated in the presence of the former CEO (if he
was highly regarded) and was previously the new CEO's boss. The new
CEO might have great affection and respect for her/his former boss. This
might be intimidation to frank and open discussion.
Two U.S. leading former CEO's, Michael Blumenthal and another former CEO said
respectively, "I absolute/y agree that a former GEO should not be in the board, such a
person, even a very good one, can be in an impossible bind. If he criticizes the new
incumbent, he is suspect if he has real reservations and does not speak out he is not
doing his job. Save him the dilemma" (Gou/son-Thomas 1993). The other former CEO
said "I made a mistake in staying in the board after stepping down as GEO. The
discussions were painful, I never knew when I should comment or when I should keep
quiet and it was just not a good idea to stay there. If people wanted my views they could
obtain them in other ways" (Ralph 1996).
Our experience and observations are that retiring CEO's are not only encouraged to stay
on the boards as non-executive directors, but assume the non-executive chairmanship
of the company. There are· a number of living examples in South Africa, starting with
Anglo American Group. The Standard Bank Group for example, Or Conrad Strauss
when he retired as CEO he became chairman until two years ago when he was replaced
by Oerek Cooper - who doubles up as chairman of liberty life - a major shareholder in
the Standard Bank Group. Chris liebenberg was the CEO of the Nedcor Group and
assumed the chairmanship after retiring as CEO (although he had a two year stint as
Minister of Finance in the Mandela Government). The frequency with which former
CEO's have continued to serve as directors and/or as chairman in the boards in which
they were CEO's and the impact of this on the effectiveness of the board is an area that
needs further scientific investigation.
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SUB-THEME IV - EXECUTIVE AND NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS
There is a general view, that non-executive directors because of their "independence"
should be in the majority of boards, especially those of publicly owned companies
(listed).
All non-executive respondents felt that non-executive directors should be in the majority.
Whilst 80% of the executive director respondents felt very strongly that there should be a
balance between executive and non-executive directors Le. 50:50 basis. 10% of these
respondents (executive directors) said in fact executive directors should be in the
majority, because they are closer to the pulse of the business.
Another 10% of the executive directors agreed with non-executive directors notion that,
non-executive directors should be in the majority.
The extent of this bias towards non-executive directors varied from the following ratios:
90% to 10% - 10% in favour
80% to 20% - 15% in favour
75% to 25% - 40% in favour
70% to 30% - 20% in favour
60% to 40% - 15% in favour
Those who were predisposed towards the non-executive majority advanced a number of
factors to support such a position:
o Independent thinking that is required. Executive directors are too close to the
business and have inherent potential for conflict of interest.
o There is normally collusion between executive directors
o In order that executives do not get carried away with their own directions as
opposed to boards strategy and control.
On the other hand, executive directors countered this view by saying:
o You need a strong executive base to guide non-executive base
o More executive directors to ensure that the business is run efficiently.
o You need strong substance and balance
o Companies need more dedication and commitment from directors than that
given by non-executive directors.
The companies in our sample, as recorded in Chapter 3 - have more non-executive
directors than executive directors.
However, our research and observations indicate that the majority of the non-executive
directors in South Africa tend to be "inside directors" - they are not independent
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directors as defined and outlined in the King 1I Report. The majority of these non-
executive directors tend to be representatives of shareowners, who have the ability to
control and/or significantly influence management. This is applicable to company E, 0,
C and B in our sample.
The question that arises is; How does this impact on the effectiveness of such boards?
Further research is required in this area.
SUB-THEME V - BOARD COMMITTEES
Virtually all boards of directors of large, privately particularly publicly owned corporations
operate using committees to assist them. A committee structure permits the board to
address key areas in more depth than may be possible in a full board meeting.
As observed in Chapter 3 the 5, companies in our primary sample Le. Company A, B, C,
D and E Le. parastatal, black economic empowerment unlisted, municipal entity and the
publicly owned (listed) companies did have board sub-committees.
Company B and Company 0 did not have neither the audit nor the remuneration
subcommittees. In the case of Company B, the executive committee undertakes the
duties and functions of the audit and remuneration committees, which, is very powerful
in this company and meets once a month. In the case of the municipal entity, the audit
functions are located in the finance committee, whereas, the remuneration aspects are
dealt with under the human resources subcommittee. Companies A, C and E complied
with the requirements of the King 11 Report as they have in place the audit and
remuneration subcommittees.
All companies in our sample did not have nomination committees, which have recently
found favour with King 11 Report. King 11 Report is very cautious. However, actually
accentuating the fact that nominating committees might be inappropriate in certain
circumstances. The King 11 Report says "While the committee was previously not
disposed towards nomination committees, there is evidence to suggest that, in
appropriate circumstances such a body can provide a useful forum in which to assist the
board to identify suitable candidates for consideration. n The King 11 Report does not
elaborate on the appropriate circumstances, but our own view is that nominating
committees could play a crucial, central and critical role not only in assisting the whole
board in a formal and transparent procedure in the appointment of directors, but effective
evaluation of the board individually and as a collective. Of the major committees,
nominating committee is one of the newest and least defined but has gained major
ground in the U.S.
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Ralph D. Ward says on nominating committees - editor of the popular U.S. magazine
called "The Corporate Board" - a nationally recognised writer and commentator on the
role of corporate boards of directors and their future in American Corporate Governance
says "The nominating committees are gaining rapidly in corporate popularity. The 1995
Kom / Ferry survey found 71 % of major companies have on (though the prevalence
declines amongst smaller corporation) In 1973 the same survey found them at a
negligible 2.4% of corporations. In 1994 Ted Jadick of Heidrich & Struggles called
nominating committees "the most striking example of board committee coming of age".
In our secondary sample of individual directors (25) - 8% of those respondents said their
companies had a nominating committee that were assigned for searching for new
directors on whose recommendation the board based its appointments.
Many boards have been accused of "inbred sameness". Directors in most U.S. and U.K.
corporations were wealthy, middle-aged white guys who too often both looked and
thought alike. Such concerns fit in well with South African boards, which are dominated
by the same old guys. The need to reflect the demographic reality in all spheres of the
South African corporate life is encouraging the appointment of women and blacks in
corporate boards. Since the South African boards have been accused of being too
insular and self-generating the need for an objective, outward looking transparent
process in the form of a nominating committee becomes even more desirable. The
tendency of the CEO or chairman or CEO/chairman (combined in one person)
suggesting another CEO of his acquaintance, as an impressive addition to the board and
the board members already constituting the board duly agreeing would be avoided.
The nominating committee has added a patina of professionalism and objectivity to the
process of deciding board membership needs. Although right up to the present day,
suggestions for new directors still typically come from the CEO, the nominating
committee has both supported and compiled a better strategic consideration of the
boards' roster (Brancato Carolyn 1996).
100% of the respondents had executive committees of their boards. 16% did not audit
committees. 28% did not have remuneration committees.
The functions of the remuneration committee were located in the human resources
committee of the board.
Smaller boards tended to centralise these functions, either in the board or finance or
human resources committee. All respondents who did not have some of these
committees (audit and remuneration) as advocated by King 11 Report confirmed that
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these issues were not totally ignored as they were handled at another level within the
board.
Matter or/and issues dealt within the various board committees were never left without
discussion at board level. Minutes of the board committees were circulated with the
main board papers for information and perusal by all board members including those
who were not members of the respective board committee.
A standing agenda item on each board committee was the general practice. The
chairperson of each committee made a short presentation highlighting the significant
aspects in the deliberations of his/her board committee.
Each board member is always at liberty to raise questions or issues with any matter
captured in the minutes or the subcommittee chair input.
Committees appraise the full board of their activities on a regular basis. The bottom-line
is that in most boards drawn in our sample processes are there and monitored to keep
the boards informed through oral and/or written reports.
In conclusion, it is important to say that a particular committee structure is not essential
for all companies. What is important is that the independent members of the board
address key issues effectively. Other committees such as executive or finance
marketing etc. committees other than the audit, remuneration committees may also be
used, Company C is a typical example (it had more committees than any other company
in our sample) it finds it useful to establish additional committees to examine special
problems or opportunities in greater depth than would otherwise be feasible.
Most importantly and crucial to avoid any overlap and grey areas, each committee
should be clearly defined and understood. A written charter approved by the board
or/and board resolution establishing the committee is appropriate.
The final approval rests with the whole board. Committees should not make major policy
decisions for the board as a whole. The board ratifies and/or endorses the
recommendations of each board subcommittee.
4.4 DIFFERENT SELECTION PROCEDURES FOR BOARD OF DIRECTORS' IN
SOUTH AFRICA.
THEME A: THE RATIONALE FOR SELECTION TO THE BOARD/S
Shareholders have the ultimate responsibility for selecting board members to ensure a
mixed balance of skills and in the long-term interest of the company. Academic
background, business skills and experience of members tend to play an important role in
their selection.
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Diversity in U.S. and U.K. boards has become an issue for some time. However, in
South Africa black empowerment and employment equity, which is going to change the
face of boards. Furthermore, diversity of both backgrounds and perspectives beyond
gender and racial profile is important in composing a board but it needs to be achieved
without sacrificing agreement on common set of assumptions about the institution and its
mission. Having an effective board involves not only recruiting exceptional individuals
who are well suited to the requirements of a particular organisation but also assembling
a group of people who compliment one another by contributing a variety of background
experiences and perspectives (Bowen William 1994).
All respondents in our sample agreed that there should be selection guidelines to assist
their boards in the recruitment, appointment and removal of directors. We have already
indicated that they also endorsed King 11 report recommendations on the selection of
directors. However, only 60% of the respondents companies had selection guidelines.
The balance of 40% did not have SUCh. In most of these companies, traditionally,
prospective directors were nominated to the board through the suggestion and support
of directors but predominately by the CEO and/or chairman. This has been the process,
the beginning and the end of the matter with the endorsement by the whole board and
approval of shareholders serving only as the legal punctuation for the process. This is
applicable to the 3 companies in the sample with the exception of Company A and D. In
the case of Company A, nominations are sought from the public by the responsible
ministry. The ministries' recommendation is then tabled to the cabinet for approval. In
the case of the municipal entity - the executive committee of municipality must first
approve nominations, which are drawn not only from the board recommendations but
also from other stakeholders. However, there is no clear and transparent process that is
written or laid down and followed except for the fact that the executive committee must
approve nominations.
Further probing of the respondents in terms of the desirability of selection guidelines
resulted in some confusion. They tended to interchange (confuse) guidelines and the
actual criteria that should be utilised in selecting directors.
Some of these are captured below:
o Leadership qualities
o Ability to think strategically
o Expertise, experience, continuity











Compatibility with King 11 Report
Quality of networks
Demonstrated and relevant experience
Availability, commitment and passion
Understanding of the industry
Integrity, competence, independence
Influence, insight, dedication
Ability to work with others
Political clout and influence - (it must be said that one respondent was
tbtally against this when she said "It is a joke in most cases, these boards
have a tendency now of looking for political clout and of famous people
even if they do not add value commercially, as long as their names are
there")
Clearly what is outlined above are not the reasons why boards should have selection
guidelines but the qualities that those selected should have.
However, there were few relevant comments relating to what selection guidelines would
bring about including the following:
o Balance of skills
o To avoid" broerkap" and jobs for pals
o To demystify and expose weakness of collegiality
o To bring in new perspectives and approaches
o Breaking down the "old boys school club network" which has put most
boards in a mess
o To encourage robust and courageous debate
o Specialist skills, which can compliment other skills in the board.
Whilst all respondents confirmed the presence of women and blacks in their board of
directors - they are still in the minority and not in line with the demographic reality of
South Africa. A disturbing trend that is developing is that few faces particularly those
who are politically connected seem to be dominating the South African corporate boards.
They are overburdened with directorships. Spme of them have more than 10
directorships. The question that arises - can they really be effective board members?
Or are they just spectators? This raises a further question - Should there be a limit to
the directorships that one individual can hold at a point in time?
-~~~ -- ---- --- -- -- -----
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A closer look at the companies in our sample indicates that most women and black
directors are there for their skills, background, experience, demonstrated leadership and
track record, not political clout.
The issue of board diversity in South Africa is going to be one of the most powerful
trends in board make-up given the seriousness with which the government is taking the
Black Economic Empowerment Commission's Report initiated by the Black Business
Council.
This report makes specific recommendations on the composition of boards in the terms
of gender and racial profile.
It is our belief that those companies that ignore such do so at their own disadvantage.
We sincerely hope that the quotation from Ralph D Ward on the issue won't hold true in
South Africa, he said in 1996 "Despite 20 years of effort to add women and minorities to
corporate boards, most still look like the cynical tag applied to Richard Nixons' first
cabinet - "Twelve grey haired white guys named George"".
THEME B: THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR BECOMING A DIRECTOR
The knowledge of business, achievement in a chosen field and track record coupled with
a person having a reasonable qualification, understanding and interpretation of financial
statements were seen by most respondents as the minimum requirement to qualify as a
director.
What was interesting is that almost 70% of the respondents felt that the minimum
requirements were dependent on the size, turnover and complexity of the industry.
Some respondents - 48% saw matric and years of experience as a prerequisite for non-
executive director appointments. A post matric qualification for executive directors
coupled with coalface experience was touted by 90% of the executive directors in our
sample.
Good communication skills were seen as important. 40% of the respondents felt that
academic qualifications were irrelevant - what was important was financial
understanding, some measure of business achievement and more importantly good
knowledge and understanding of the industry.
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THEME C: WHY THEY WERE SELECTED AS DIRECTORS.
70% of the respondents were selected because of their business experience. 60% of
the respondents thought they were selected because of their competence and
understanding of the industry in which they were serving.
Another 60% believed that they were appointed because of their community
involvement, the quality and spread of their network, 60% of these respondents were
black, 40% of the respondents were appointed because of their speciality skills. 60%
thought that their independent thinking got them the nod. All women in the sample
thought their independent streak won them the day.
30% thought that they were appointed because they were shareholders or/and
represented shareholders.
30% sighted demonstrated leadership as the reason.
A number of other reasons were advanced including:
o Being a woman
o Being black
o Being KZN based
o Commitment to the organisation
o Contribution to corporate strategy
o Academic and business background
o Contact base
o Person of colour (Indian)
o Integrity
o Performance and credibility as an executive.
The most striking observation is that there is a direct correlation between these
responses and the qualities highlighted in Theme A (The rationale for selection to
boards) under the selection procedures for board of directors in South Africa.
THEME D: INDUCTION PROGRAMME FOR DIRECTORS.
Table 4.10: Induction programmes in board of directors
RESPONSES FREQUENCIES PERCENTAGE
Yes, there is an induction 10 40%
No, there is no induction 15 60%
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Table 4.10 shows that 40% of respondents agree that there was induction and another
60% said there was no induction programme conducted in boards in which they are
involved.
All respondents felt that induction of new directors was absolutely critical. Proper
induction is seen as key to effective and cohesive board, enabling new incumbents to
gain deeper understanding of the company's business operations and environment. It
provides new directors with a base not only to familiarise themselves but also, gain
deeper insight into the company's vision, strategy, aims and objectives. In short in order
to be effective board members all new directors need to know about all aspects of the
company's business through an induction programme.
THEME E: AWARENESS OF EDUCATIONAL, TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMMES AIMED AT EMPOWERING ASPIRANT, POTENTIAL AND CURRENT
DIRECTORS TO BE EFFECTIVE IN THEIR ROLES AND DUTIES.
Table 4.11: Need and awareness of empowerment programmes for
aspiring and current directors
RESPONSES FREQUENCIES PERCENTAGE
Need 25 100%
No need 0 0%
Aware 16 64%
Not aware 9 36%
Table 4.11 shows all respondents felt there was a need for educational training and
development programmes aimed at empowering aspirant potential and current directors.
This is in line with their response to the induction of new directors. It also shows that
64% of respondents are aware about the programmes for empowering aspiring and
current directors to be effective in their roles and duties. The programmes mentioned
above include the directors' course at the University of Western Cape, the Cape Town
Business Schools' programmes including the Executive development programme, 60%
of respondents rated this programme very good. 30% thought it was good. The institute
of directors' programme was mentioned by 40% of the respondents. 35% of the
respondents alluded to the Graduate Institute of Management and Technologies" (GMIT)
postgraduate diploma in company direction as the best and most relevant programme.
This programme is done in collaboration with Henley University in the UK. The Black
Management Forums' Director Development Programme was mentioned by 40% of the
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respondents. Kagiso Leadership School programme was mentioned by 10% of the
respondents.
16% of the respondents said that International Auditing firms in South Africa offered
some courses and programmes aimed at aspirant, political and current directors. These
programmes and courses were a critical ingredient for board effectiveness. They were
seen to be enabling directors to understand and execute their roles effectively.
Furthermore the relevance of such training and development was seen in terms of South
Africa's peculiar history and policies of exclusion and the fact that director's
responsibilities were different to those of management. Directors are accountable to all
stakeholders.
THEME F: DIRECTORS AWARENESS OF THEIR DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS.
Table 4.12: Directors awareness of their duties
RESPONSES FREQUENCIES PERCENTAGE
Aware 13 52%
Not aware 12 48%
Table 4.12 shows that 48% of respondents, feel that directors are not aware of their
duties and obligations. The argument here is that most companies do not put an
emphasis on educating their boards on these obligations and duties. They take it for
granted, that, when people accept appointments as directors, they know exactly what is
expected of them. 100% of African respondents felt that at times, it was a deliberate
attempt, by established partners of empowerment companies, to thrive on the ignorance
of the other black directors, who are not aware of their duties and obligations. They are
new entrants in this game. Other directors, 40%, felt it was the duty of any aspirant
director, to make sure that they understood and appreciated their duties and obligations.
30%, of the respondents felt that most directors have been around far too long and have
not made it their effort to become current with their duties and obligations, as enshrined
in King 11 Report (For example).
THEME G: APPROPRIATE STEPS FOR ENSURING THAT EACH AND EVERY
DIRECTOR IS AWARE OF HIS/HER DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS IN TERMS OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND EXPECTATIONS OF STAKEHOLDERS.
All respondents think that the directors must undergo extensive training, on their duties
and responsibilities. The King 2 Report, on corporate governance, should be by law, a
compulsory training module dUring induction of directors. Furthermore, refresher
courses were appropriate and would be a welcome development. Duties, obligations
--------------~= ----- -------
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and responsibility of directors should be part of an ongoing discussion and an issue at
board meetings.
THEME H: PERCEIVED STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE PRESENT
BOARD\S IN TERMS OF STRUCTURE, SIZE AND MEMBERSHIP.
Most respondents think that most boards are too big and consist of many directors who
are not committed. Moreover, the nature of the structure is biased towards white males.
Most Executive directors are White males. In fact, this is also applicable to non-
executive directors. This also, negates the size and membership of the board.
Furthermore, this encouraged "passengerism" if the board was too big. The tendency is
to flood boards with black non-executive directors, who don't wield much influence, nor
have insight into operations, which, is normally found in executive directors. Black
executive directors are in the minority, in comparison to non-executive directors. Real
power lies in executive directors, who are in day-to-day control of companies. The need
for demographic diversification in board membership at both executive and non-
executive director level, can no longer be overemphasised, more black executive
directors are needed.
THEME I: BLACK DIRECTORS IN BOARD\S




Table 4.13 shows that 100% of the respondents agree that there are black directors in
their boards. The main motivation for having black directors is to undo the imbalances of
the past, since it is perceived that Blacks are the future in the economic strength of this
country. It is not only based on the levelling of the playing fields, but unleashing the full
economic potential of the country by harnessing all available talent and resources.
THEME J: EQUITY IN BOARD/S OF DIRECTORS
Table 4.14: Gender equity in board of directors
RESPONSES FREQUENCIES PERCENTAGE
Yes, there are women 25 100%
No, there are not 0 0%
77
Table 4.14 shows that 100% of respondents agree that there are women in their boards
of directors. The unfortunate part is two fold - there are too few women who are
directors. Most companies have only a lone female on their boards. In the U.S. of the
Top Fortune 50 in the early 90's, 54% of companies had only one woman on their board
and 30% of the companies had no woman on their board. Mind you, this is happening
against the activist campaign to increase the representation of women in boards having
started in 1970 (Feminist Majority Foundation - 2001). This is found in most boards in
South Africa; particularly the Business Times Top 100 companies. It is doubtful, whether
women represent more than 10% (we are being generous - Institute of Directors refuse
to give this information). Although women have made inroads into U.S. middle
management, the senior levels of corporations remain exclusively male domains. In the
early 90's only 5.6% of Fortune Service 500 directorships were held by women and 4.5%
of Fortune 500 (Feminist Research Centre 2002). Furthermore, what is disturbing is that
some women dominated the South African boards (same faces). This was equally true
even in our sample. Women directors in some instances are busier than their male
counterparts. (One lady in our sample is holding 9 directorships): Borrowing from 1995
(catalyst census on female board of directors study "Certain Estimable Women" take up
an unusually high number of the seats held by females. This is a trend very much in
evidence in South Africa; we believe there are many good women out there who need to
be roped in to these boards.
To date, we have a limited pool of outstanding women, who are unfortunately
monopolising boards of directors. What happened with the male domination of boards
by few individuals should be nipped at the bud. There must be more women out there
who are sawy, competent, and strong and could be an invaluable asset to any board.
White, Indian and Coloured female directors seem to be out numbered by their African
counterparts. Whilst black female directors are still very small, they far exceed the other
racial groups. Minority representatively, which took U.S. Corporate boards by storm in
the 70's - (though proving to be a damp squibb in the long run) seem to be now
obtaining in South Africa. Off course, in South Africa it is the other way around, not
minorities but the majority that ahs been excluded.
4.6: COMPENSATION OF DIRECTORS IN BOARD\S.
THEME A - HOW DIRECTORS ARE COMPENSATED
The compensation of directors is different and varies from board to board. All boards
across sectors tend to compensate directors in terms of size, number of meetings and
length of meetings in which a member participated. The other boards compensate
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directors on a monthly or quarterly basis, irrespective of the number or length of board
meetings. The rationale being that directors remain directors who must still carry their
fiduciary duties and discharge their obligations at meetings and outside meetings. They
remain directors at all times during their term of office. "Exercising their duties and
obligations does not end with board meetings" (Reddy Vivian 2002) 30% of all
respondents were paid per meetings in our sample.
An equal proportion of respondents 30% were compensated in the form of board fees
per month or quarterly.
20% of the respondents indicated that the number and the length of meetings attended
determine their compensation.
10% of the respondents were compensated only for subsistence and travel costs. This
was relevant to non-profit organisations and municipal entities.
It might just be opportune to briefly look at alternative bases of remuneration, which has
wide spread options and may have relevance to non-profit bodies.
These are:
o No Remuneration
The option is based on the premise that participation in the board is
voluntary. The following risks however are pretty obvious:
• The board may not attract non-executive directors of the calibre and
credibility it requires.
• The level of commitment offered by individuals may not be
satisfactory.
o Symbolic fees
• The payment of a symbolic fee recognises that individuals offering
their skills and experience be remunerated at a nominal amount.
o Compensation for loss of income
This recognises that individuals offer their skills and experience at an
opportunity cost and on this basis aims to compensate them for income
they would have lost in return for their services.
o A combination of symbolic fees and compensation for loss of income.
This is a middle ground between nominal fee and partial compensation
of loss of earnings.
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(Reproduced from Manase Associates Document - titled "First Draft
Report on the preparation of shareholders policy with respect to
remuneration of board members of municipality funded entities")
The following is a summary of the relevant principles extracted from the
King 11 Report:
• Non-executive directors should be individuals of calibre
and credibility, and have the necessary skill and
experience to bring judgement to bear independent of
management, on issues of strategy. performance.
resources, transformation, diversity and employment
equity. standards of conduct and evaluation performance.
• Levels of remuneration should be sufficient to attract,
retain and motivate executives of the quality required by
the board.
• The practice of paying non-uniform fees to non-executive
directors should also be carefully considered. The level of
fees should preferably be determined according to the
relative contributions of each non-executive director and
their participation in the activities of the board and its
committees.
The question we should be asking:
o Would the companies paying only for subsistence and travel costs attract
the right calibre?
o Would they attract retired White executives who were rich?
o How does this impact on maximising and harmonising all stakeholders'
interests?
o Can we afford to exclude people who are poor from these boards?
o Who has what it takes?
The remaining 10% of the respondents is divided equally among those who claim that
they are compensated relative to size of company. poorly compensated. compensation
dependent on attendance of meetings and only after director's reports have been read;
and no compensation for non-executive directors.
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THEME B - WHERE DOES THE COMPENSATION DECISION FOR DIRECTORS
LIE?
Every publicly owned corporation should have a committee comprised solely of
independent directors that addresses compensation issues. This compensation
committee is at times called remuneration committee whereas in some companies it is
called compensation committee. Three of the companies in our sample Company A, C
and E had remuneration committees, whilst Company B· and D did not have these
committees. In company B, the executive committee dealt with the matter. In company
D, the municipal entity, the HR committee dealt with the issue of compensation.
Compensation or remuneration committees have two interrelated responsibilities:
overseeing the corporations overall remuneration regime and setting CEO and Senior
Management packages.
40% of our respondents said remuneration committees decided on the compensation of
directors in their boards.
30% said the full board decided.
10% said the Minister responsible or, MEC or executive committee of the municipality
decided.
10% said .management of the parent/holding company (who are directors of the
subsidiary) normally takes the decision.
The remaining 10% are divided equally among those who responded: Human resource
committee and shareholders decide on this and those who had no idea whatsoever.
The critical importance of director compensation cannot be overlooked or deferred to the
sidelines if boards are to be effective and deliver to stakeholder groups.
4.7 EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
THEME A: CRITICAL FACTORS IN BOARD EFFECTIVENESS
In summary, this question generated wide-ranging responses.
Overall, the most frequent factors mentioned were those, which emphasized the
responsibilities of the board as far as their leadership roles, is concerned. It was
strongly suggested that they are expected to be the leaders of the company's strategy
and provide clear strategic direction.
Second to that, was the need to possess business acumen, especially financial (e.g. be
conversant with financial statement, which are the main indicators of the business
performance). This should be underlined by a full understanding of the business in
which the company was operating, their markets and products. Monitoring performance
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and achievement of strategic objectives and providing necessary support for the
realisation of stated strategic objectives. Further thereto were various positive traits or
characteristics expected from board members. These ranged from integrity; honesty and
transparency, objectivity, decisiveness, accountability, credibility and diligence.
Commitment and protecting the best interest of the company and improving the triple
bottom-line, which includes economic social and environmental performance.
THEMEB: FACTORS THAT MAKE OTHER BOARDS MORE EFFECTIVE THAN
OTHERS
Table 4.15 Factors contributing to effectiveness
ACTIVITIES RANK
Accountability 1
Strategic Direction /Independence 2
Transparency, Stipulate objectives/understanding 3
Social responsibility, Monitor activities and objectives 4
Table 4.15 shows that respondents think that accountability is the most important factor
that makes a board more effective than others. The next most important factors were
giving a clear strategic direction and independence followed by stipulating objectives.
The last in ranking order is social responsibility and monitoring activities of strategic
objectives. The measurement of effectiveness of the board is determined by the quality
of questions they asked in the meetings; their attendance of meetings; continuous
interaction with the chair and with each other's; through accountability and transparency.
Understanding the business, the sector, the product and the market also featured
prominently. Although the above methods are used to measure the effectiveness of the
board, it should be measured through the following methods:
~ Company should achieve revenue targets as set out by the board.
~ Accountability to shareholders.
THEME C: HOW SHOULD BOARD EFFECTIVENESS BE MEASURED?
While there was a number of respondents who did not respond to this question, most of
those that did respond, pointed to measuring effectiveness by gauging the performance
of the company. Was it reaching its revenue targets? Were its strategic goals being
met?
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THEME 0; SIR CADBURY STATEMENT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The basic Governance issues concern the effectiveness and accountability of the
Board of Directors. How well do boards run their companies and how they can be
encouraged to run them better.
Table 4.16: Participants opinion on the statement by Sir Cadbury.
RESPONSES FREQUENCIES PERCENTAGE
Agreement 20 80
Do not agree 5 20
Table 4.16 shows that 80% of respondents agree with Sir Cadbury statement on
corporate governance, whereas 20% did not agree. There are reasons for this
agreement. They include that; there is a lot at stake for the shareholders who can only
be protected by the boards. It is basically the main aim of all boards. Accountability,
effectiveness and efficiency are key to success. For far too long directors have not been
held accountable for the performance of the company or companies. They have been
totally insulated and protected; they have been Lords and Gods unto themselves.
However, today aggressive institutional shareholders have put the whole question of
accountability and effectiveness in the forefront (Bowen, 1994). Board members now
can be held liable for poor corporate governance. Board provides leadership and
experience. The effectiveness and accountability of boards should be improved. Boards
need to understand their accountability and their fiduciary duties in order to do an
effective job of leading the organization. The importance of corporate governance lies in
its contribution both to business, accountability, credibility, and transparency associated
with the organization.
THEME E: BOARD EFFECTIVENESS AND OVERALL PERFORMANCE
(i) Does Board Composition impact on Board Effectiveness?
All respondents that responded to this question did so with a unanimous "yes". Their
comments varied, but were by and large clearly suggesting that it will take the right
people to produce the right results. The main response suggests that directors with
the right skills, expertise, business acumen and commitment will bring positive
impact on the boards effectiveness. It emerged by way of suggestion that non-
alignment of certain members of the board can have a detrimental effect on the
reaching of decisions. A further suggestion was that issues of race, gender and
religion are addressed if the board is properly composed. Another response
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cautioned against boards composed of too many people possessing same skills, e.g.
accountants, as this provides a particular slant on the business
(ii) Relationship between Board Composition and Overall Performance.
The overriding factor in board effectiveness according to all respondents without
exception must be reflected in the overall performance of the company as measured
in the shareholders wealth created.
In short the quality of the board makes the difference.
84% of the respondents were very positive that there was a direct relationship between
the composition of the board and overall performance. Whilst 16% thought there was no
positive or direct correlation between composition and overall performance of the
company.
It is very significant that the 16% that didn't see any relationship between the two were
executive directors in their companies. There is an indication that whenever the
executive directors felt their power or/and position threatened tended to adopt a
defensive stance.
Their argument is supported by notions that management at the end of the day has a
sway and more impact than non-executive directors. Depth of skills and day-to-day
operations are located in executive directors (management), which enhances the overall
performance of the company. However, there was a strong case for a relationship
between composition and overall performance, despite executive directors assertions.
Well-govemed boards, which comprises of competent people and individuals whether
non-executive and/or executive directors always show consistent results. A board
composed of individuals with necessary but varied and critical skills and disciplines can
enhance the overall performance of the company. The board furthermore plays an
important role in the determination, implementation and monitoring of the strategic
direction of the company. A proactive and effective board reviews results and demands
performance from the CEO/managing director and members of top and senior
management. Most respondents agreed that a weak board would be unable to provide
strategic direction, which would impact negatively on the performance of the company.
It was the board's prerogative to approve the organisations strategy and ensure control
over its implementation. In a nutshell and the majority of respondents (84%) agree
effective boards create highly successful companies. It is also true that boards cannot
substitute for the required quality and motivation of the fulltime management but cannot
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abdicate their responsibility and role in the strategic direction, approval of strategy,
monitoring the performance of the CEO's and speed of implementation.
There can be no de-linking the composition of the board and overall performance of the
company. However, with the triple bottom-line concept performance measurement
cannot be limited to financial measures like return on equity and earnings per share.
The balanced scorecard - measures that drive perform~nce as expounded by Robert S
Kaplan and David P Norton (Marvin Bower Professor of Leadership Development at the
Harvard Business School and founder and President of the Renaissance Worldwide
Strategy Group - Boston USA - respectively).
This leading edge performance measurement gives directors and top management a
fast but comprehensive view of the business. The balanced scorecard includes financial
measures that tell results of actions already taken. These are complimented with three
sets of operational measures having to do with customer satisfaction, internal processes
and the company's ability to learn and improve - the activities that drive future financial
performance (Harvard Business review on measuring corporate performance - Harvard
Business School Press 1998).
4.8 EVALUATION OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS
THEME A: EVALUATION OF DIRECTORS ON THEIR PERFORMANCE
Table 4.17: Evaluation of directors' performance
RESPONSES FREQUENCIES PERCENTAGE
Yes, there is performance 0 0%
evaluation
No, there is no 25 100%
performance evaluation
Table 4.17 shows that 100% respondents reported that there is no performance
evaluation of directors across all sectors. There are a number of factors, which cause
lack of performance evaluation among directors. These are; directors within boards that
are too scared to be evaluated. There is no incentive towards the evaluation of directors.
Whilst the question on how directors should be evaluated is an important element, there
seems to be some reluctance to do so. A number of issues arise: should performance
appraisals be formalised and become part of this effective management style? Should
the senior employees participate in the evaluation of the Chief Executive Officers or not?
The non-executive directors, should they be evaluated by their active presence,
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participation at meetings, or/and contribution to the bottom-line? How should these be
measured? Who should evaluate them?
Whilst there was no performance evaluation of directors our respondents felt that with
such negative developments in the corporate world particularly the demise of Enron,
World Com and others in South Africa such as Leisure Net, Regal Bank to mention a
few, the need for the evaluation of directors performance should be central to effective .
corporate governance. A number of other reasons are advanced such as:
o This is a new development but necessary as passenger directors are of no
value
o Old outdated systems, which put the onus on the performance of executive
management, should be done away with.
o Non-executive directors had it easy in the past
o Evaluation of directors would ensure superior performance
4.8 SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM
THEME A -VIEWS OF THE RESPONDENTS
28% of the respondents responded to this aspect whilst the balance was non-committal
and made no comment whatsoever.
Whether this has to do with headlines in the Business Media in South Africa such as:
o "Shareholder Activism is still limited in South Africa"
o "Activist asset managers may shoot themselves in the foot"
o "Investors declare war on directors"
o "Shareholders have had enough of sitting back and waiting for results"
o "Shareholder activism issues come thick and fast these days"
o "Activism bug could bite" etc.
The subject of shareholder activism seems to be taboo and controversial.
However, all the respondents that expressed their views, were very positive believing
that it was a healthy development as long as it remained rationale and constructive and
not interfering with executive responsibilities. They felt that for too long South African
institutional investors had been passive preventing minorities from being proactive in the
midst of inactive and/or reactive institutional investors who were all powerful and very
influential.
The dramatic events such as Enron abroad and closer home, Profurn, Comparex,
Primedia, Kersaf, Durban Roodepoort Deep, Regal Private Treasury Bank, Unifer,
==- . - ---~--,_.-'~._- - - --
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Macmed etc. have activated shareholders from their passive yolks. Respondents
actually said "Given what we see in the world today, shareholders must become
activists". Shareholders must demand to be fully informed, briefed continuously by the
chair and the CEO of the company.
THEME B: WHY SHOULD IT BE ENCOURAGED?
Respondent's comments revolved around:
o to keep the boards on their toes, not in their laurels
o shareholder activism brings in new perspectives direct from
shareholders with vested interest
o to ensure accountability of management
o leaving absolute trust to management has proven extremely
dangerous
o to reduce and minimise risk to shareholders, depending on what is at
stake.
THEME C: OUR OBSERVATIONS
Clearly shareholder activism is on the ascendancy. The underlying factors for such
activism seem to lie when things go wrong or perceived to be moving in the wrong
direction. Piet Viljoen, the Chief Investment strategist at Investec Asset Managers
seems to underpin this observation when he says "The changes have less to do with
renewed shareholder activism than with shareholders taking action in a bear market,
where shares are under performing. In some cases companies are sitting on piles of
cash". Empirical evidence conducted in USA indicates that shareholders are most vocal
when the market is bearish - this has however not stopped even during times of
economic boom. The pressure on boards to truly hold management accountable, to
exercise strong oversight and to increase shareholder value has been quietly building
during a time of economic growth. What will it be like when the next recession actually
hits us? The next recession in US is certain to come sooner or later - economics
assures us of that 0Nard Ralph 0 21 st Century Corporate Board -1996).
It is also clear that this activism is led mainly by institutional investors, Adele Shevel and
Gaenor Lipson writing in Business Times June 23, 2002 had this to say "Shareholders in
South African companies are finally digging in their heels and calling for action to get
value out of their investment. Long lambasted for being passive participants in
companies, more inclined to walk away from a dud investment than do anything to
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change the status quo - institutional investors called for and in one case achieved
change this week".
Allan Gray Asset Management, Active Value (UK based investor) Investee Asset
Management, are few examples of institutional investors who have been leading this
activism in South Africa in recent times. 15 years ago, the shareholders upheavals
would have been unheard of, particularly from private pension funds and mutual funds,
but, with the rude awakening of shareholders value destruction -institutional investors
world over seem to be everywhere at once, going public, compiling figures, granting
interviews, lambasting directors and in fact asking for a shake-up in boards - replacing
incumbent directors with their own representatives. "Board performance today is now
being handicapped as closely as eEO's quarterly results. The boards pay perks, size
and structure are being studied carefUlly as share price for indicators of the company's
prospects" (Ward 1996).
This interesting development of shareholder activism raises a number of pertinent
questions:
o Should board representation be in line with shareholding structure (shareholder
activists are demanding board seats)?
o Whose interests are these activist representatives representing in the board?
Are they representing the best interest of the company and all shareholders?
Is this possible?
o What about the possible conflict of interest that may arise? Is this in conflict
with the groundbreaking judgement by Justice Boschof in Cohen versus Segal?
"They (directors) occupy a fiduciary position towards the company and must
exercise their powers bona fide solely for the benefit of the company as a
whole and not for ulterior motive" Max Gebhardt of' the Business Report
arguing on this point say and we agree that what the learned Judge was saying
was that directors were appointed not to be servants of shareholders but
servants of the company. This fiduciary role is given credence in the King 11
Report on corporate governance, which says directors must act in the best
interest of the company and never for any sect oral interest.
o How will this concerted effort to have major shareholder representatives as
directors impinge on the desirability and/or requirement for the demographic
reality of South Africa to be. reflected in boards and top management
(Employment Equity Act)?
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Whilst shareholders activism is most welcome it raises a number of fundamental
questions in the corporate govemance web.
4.9 CONCLUSION
The results and findings were presented and evaluated. The presentation of the
characteristics of respondents comes first followed by the presentation of results
according to the aims of the study. The results are presented in tables and graphs as
well as in the form of theme analysis. The findings of this research are presented
according to the results of the study in this chapter and literature search and review of
the model in Chapter 2. The latter, was carefully and systematically executed according
to a plan that involved document analysis. This was conducted in order to derive valid
conclusions about the findings. The findings in this study are discussed according to the
aims of the study. The respondents are all directors in different sectors mainly domiciled
in KwaZulu Natal (KZN), some of the directors serve in boards outside KZN.
The findings of the study show that all sectors need to develop guidelines that will help in
developing and maintaining effective boards of directors. The guidelines and





The study has clearly indicated the critical questions to be answered, as well as, aims
and hypotheses of the study. It also indicated the enhancing of the correlation between
the composition of the board of directors and board effectiveness. The qualitative and
quantitative approach used in this study gives an advantage, because, it is a small
sample that needs thorough data analysis. Data collection method shows that the
document analysis provided information on private, public, parastatal, municipal entity
and black economic empowerment companies; as well as responses from
questionnaires and follow-up interviews conducted. This allowed the researcher to
gather as much data as possible. The analysis of data yielded valuable information that
was analysed and presented elsewhere in the write-up. We, focused on the Kings
Report recommendations, as well as, the major elements of the composition of boards
particularly the distribution of power within the boards, the roles of different components
in the distribution, such as chief executive, the non-executive director etc.
5.2 COMMON OBSERVATIONS
The findings of the study show that all sectors of employment, be it in a publicly owned,
privately owned, government owned, at national provincial or local level and/or black
owned need to develop guidelines that will help in developing and maintaining effective
boards of directors. There is no question that there is a link between the composition of
boards of directors and board effectiveness. In short, how boards are composed, who
serves in the board will one way or the other impact on the effectiveness of the board of
directors.
Whilst our case study analysis adopted a comparative approach amongst the five
entities Le. Publicly owned (listed), privately owned (unlisted), municipal entity, black
empowerment and parastal (government owned) companies, there are and will be
guidelines that are equally relevant and applicable to all sectors without question.
It is also equally true that certain models/guidelines would predominate in one sector or
find more relevance than in other sectors. We have found that there may be compelling
reasons for a different approach/model or guidelines for a particular sector. William G
Bowen in his book "Inside the Boardroom" his words are instructive, "A recurring
question is which principles and propositions have some claim on universality and which
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are lightly specific to particular sectors or even to particular organisation in a given
sector at a point in time"
Our view and conclusion is that trying to impose a uniform model and guidelines such as
predetermined size of the board can seriously impact negatively on the effectiveness of
the board. This finds resonant from the words of a leading Canadian board consultant -
Michael Burns, when he says, "There is no simple "right-way" to structure your board
right. The design must reflect the maturity of the organisation and its future needs. The
assumption that all boards are alike, that all organisations have the same needs and that
they all just have to practice good govemance is problematic because this is not always
the case."
However, we need to reiterate that there are certain minimum requirements and/or
guidelines that each corporate, be it listed or unlisted, privately or publicly owned,
individually owned or government owned that must be met irrespective of the sector.
It is important to say that whilst the King 11 Report was acceptable to all our respondents
the major problem is that it is voluntary and not enforceable by law. Ours is thus not to
rehash its recommendations but to add value to them and give some teeth in a
meaningful way based on the findings of the case analysis. Whilst acknowledging that
ours has neither been final nor exhaustive, requiring further research in many areas the
following recommendations are formulated.
5.3 STRUCTURES AND SIZE OF THE BOARD
The board design or structure should reflect the boards' stage of development. Many
organisations have been caught up in the traditional/versus the Carver Model. What is
crucial and important are the needs of the organisation as pointed out by Michael Burns
elsewhere in this write-up. The needs of a small· privately owned company may be
different from a publicly listed conglomerate. No imposed uniform structure can work for
all companies. The structure that best delivers your corporate strategy is the route to
take.
This applies to size. However, we believe that board of directors should not be church
choirs, even with publicly owned conglomerates where +15 board members tend to be
the order of the day. An analysis of these boards show that managing directors or/and
chief executives of the subsidiaries are also directors of the main board e.g. Company E
in our sample. We find that only the CEO, finance director; human resource director
should be a member of the main board with the rest being in attendance. They should
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not be members of the board. They should remain members of the boards of their
divisions and/or sUbsidiaries. Given this approach we believe that a maximum number
(size) of the board of directors should not exceed 15 directors especially in publicly listed
and parastatal companies, (with varied expertise, perspectives, skill, experiences,
demography required). In unlisted - privately owned the size requirement might be less
and different e.g. private unlisted companies should not exceed 8 directors. Michel
Blumenthal quoted elsewhere - says "Twelve to fifteen is best for most corporate
boards - certainly at 18 - 24, real group cohesion, interaction, debate and collegiality
became impossible - in my experience at least as a rule if there are more than 24
members the sheer size of the board erodes its effectiveness" Board structures should
combine the detailed knowledge of executive directors with under exposure of
independent director (outside directors) either separately through a two tier board or
together in on a unitary board. Unitary boards predominate in S.A., UK and US. An
area for further research might be which model is appropriate? Is our unitary model more
effective than the other? (Two tier board system found in Germany for example) Why is
that the case if its so?
5.4 SELECTION PROCEDURES FOR BOARD OF DIRECTORS
In line with the King 1I Report recommendations, procedures for appointments to the
board should be formal and transparent and a matter of the board as a whole. A
nomination committee must assist the board. A new committee of the board that must
be mandatory for all companies without exception. The nomination committee, a new
concept in South Africa, must be part and parcel of the boards' committee system. Non-
executive directors only should constitute the nomination committee. The independent
directors should be in the majority of the non-executive directors. The chairperson of the
main board must chair this committee.
People selected to serve on boards of directors should have relevant business and/or
industry experience that is beneficial to the board as a whole. Directors with such varied
backgrounds can provide a useful perspective on significant risks and competitive
advantages and an understanding of the challenges facing the business. The
companys' need for particular backgrounds and experiences may change over time.
The board should continually monitor mix of skills and experience of its directors in order
to assess at each stage in the lifecycle of the company whether the board has the
necessary tools to perform its oversight function effectively.
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The oversight function of the board of directors depends on its independence from
management. Board independence depends not only on directors individual
relationships - personal, employment of business but also on boards overall attitude
toward management. The independence of directors must be in both fact and
appearance. Director or/and board independence has an advantage of helping resolve
conflict of interest and ensure objectivity in the board decision-making, this also gives
breadth and depth in the scope of debates on such matters as strategic vision and the
under external question with which the board deal. In selecting board members care
should be taken to avoid "incestuous" relationships and to preserve a certain amount of
distance between board members and chief executive officer (Alien William 1992)
Whilst we have attempted to provide a guideline on who should serve on the board, it is
important to overemphasise not only the general agreement that boards should have a
majority of independent non-executive directors but it is advisable to note that there are
few if any formulaic solutions to selection guidelines, nor issues of governance. We
should be ready to hear the case for an exception of anything purporting to be an
overriding principle (Bowden 1994). However, experience has shown and taught us that
it is possible even necessary to have in mind what we call presumptive norms -
propositions that should govern the size, composition and functioning of the boards
unless there is a convincing case for consciously setting aside in a particular context
(Kurtz Daniel L 1988).
Furthermore, the question of gender equity, diversity and/or racial balance is critical in
the selection and composition of boards. The recommendations on these issues will be
dealt with later in the chapter.
Finally how many directorships should one individual hold? We believe there should be
a limit on the number of directorships that an individual can hold, especially in listed and
parastal companies. A number of studies have indicated that having more than 5
directorships (listed companies) is asking for too much. Accountability is compromised.
The National Association of Pension Funds in the UK and The Association of British
Assurers have recently recommended that the executive directors be allowed to hold
only one (non-executive) directorship and that non-executive directors be limited to a
maximum of such 5 positions.
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5.5 INDUCTION OF NEW DIRECTORS
The board should have an induction programme to familiarise all incoming directors with
all aspects of the company including their fiduciary duties and responsibilities. There
must be some form of examination or individual assessment to determine directors'
knowledge of the company, its strategy and objectives, all issues pertaining to corporate
governance, including King 11 Report and other relevant international developments.
New directors with no or limited board experience should receive development and
education to inform them of their duties, responsibilities, powers, obligations and
potential personal liabilities in the conduct of the board or company. Courses such as
The Graduate Diploma in Company Direction offered by The Graduate Institute of
Management and Technology in conjunction with The Institute of Directors is very
relevant. It covers the following:
o Corporate governance, duties, responsibilities and liabilities of directors
o Strategic planning for the board -corporate reputation and branding. Ethics and
leadership.
o Finance for the board - director development
o Strategic risk and policy issues
The programme is aimed at director development and designed to be a leadership
planning and board succession tool essential to every corporation.
We believe that such courses should be recommended for new directors and those who
are out of date. The Black Management forums director development course is highly
recommended.
Furthermore, due to the dynamic nature of the corporate environment in which
companies operate it is important to have annual updates on the developments in the
area of corporate governance and legislative changes impinging on board's for all
directors. Corporate governance issues including duties, responsibilities and obligations
should be part of an ongoing and structured discussion for the whole board not an after
thought and/or fashion fad that is taking board ofdirectors by storm, King 11 Report says
"Directors have awesome responsibilities and they must be properly prepared to carry
out their duties" These words are most relevant, instructive and should be taken
seriously by all directors, new and old.
5.6 DISTRIBUTION OF POWER IN BOARDS
Where should the power in boards lie?
94
5.6.1 Chairman's' Role:
Chairman and chief executive position should be separated and not be held by one
person; unfortunately this requirement is not enforceable by law in South Africa as we
indicated in Chapter 2. Our recommendation is that in South Africa this should be a
listing requirement. We are conscious that this might not be suitable for owner/managed
private and unlisted companies. However, when the company lists it must be forced to
have the two positions separated:
• The chairman of the company must be an independent non-executive director
with no direct or/and indirect relationship with the company.
• An independent, outside unrelated non-executive director should only be
considered for the chairmanship of any publicly listed company.
• Secondly, the chairman of the company should not be drawn or selected from
immediate past chief executive of the company.
• Former chief executives may be eligible for chairmanship after at least a
minimum of 5 years complete break with the company after their retirement as
chief executive. All these guidelines are put in place to enshrine the critical
importance of the independence of the board, thus its effectiveness.
5.6.2 The Chief Executive
The split between chairperson and CEO roles is now well understood, accepted and
documented. However, no formal research seems to have been done on the optimal
tenure of the CEO or the chairperson for that matter making it an excellent topic for
further research.
However, our view is that:
• The term of office for the chief executive should be limited to 7 years. King 11
Report is silent on this issue.
• Secondly, a retiring chief executive should not be appointed as a non-executive
director or chairman of the company for reasons also stated in Chapter 4.
• The new CEO should feel free to use his/her predecessor as a consultant,
drawing from the experience, wisdom and wealth of knowledge.
It is important to emphasise that the most important task of the board is the choice of the
chief executive and the establishment of an effective relationship is even more important
(Carver 1990).
-, ------ ----- --~---,-,- ~ - --,----------------"
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We cannot underestimate; the critical, central and crucial role played by the chief
executive and as such King 11 Report recommendations on the chief executive should be
endorsed. "The appraisal and remuneration committee to guide it in its evaluation of the
performance and remuneration of the chief executive officer."
A powerfully designed CEO position is a key to board excellence. It enables the board
to focus and avoid the intricacies and short-term focus of staff management and to work
exclusively on a holistic long-term focus of governance (Deakin and Hughes 1997).
Given the board's oversight role, shareholders should not expect the board to
micromanage the company's business by performing on duplicating the tasks of the
CEO and senior executive management. Chief executives in South· Africa are
predominantly white males and neither King 11 Report, NAFCOC's, BMF and Black
Economic Empowerment Commission Report, pronounce on this particular aspect.
They say nothing on targets for blacks to be chief executives. They only pronounce on
targets for executive and non-executive directors. We believe that black and female
CEO's are too thin on the ground. A concerted effort through targets should be
developed including the credible sources from which these can be drawn. A few black
chief executives including white and black females have done very well right across the
sectorial divide. Maybe they are there because they are exceptional and have broken
fundamental barriers preventing their influx. Without much attention to this aspect - the
drive to have the demographic reality of South Africa reflected from the top, to the lowest
level, would be an elusive dream. Critical mass at the top is critical for an effective
cascading effect down the line.
5.6.3 Executive Directors
There is a general agreement that there should be a balance in the boardroom and not
an imbalance by the domination for example of one executive director or domination by
non-executive directors.' This is the cautious approach adopted even by King 11 Report.
In South Africa, boards tend to be dominated by executive directors or/and inside non-
executive directors.
If it is true that independence is a cornerstone of effective boards, we feel that
independent non-executive directors (outside unrelated non-executive directors) should
be in the majority. The majority of our sample concurred with this position although this
view did not find favour with the majority of executive directors. A ratio of 4: 1 in favour of
non-executive directors is highly recommended. Executive chairman who are also
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majority shareholders further complicates the equation in South Africa. E.g. Vivian
Reddy of Edison Corporation, Raymond Ackerman of Pick 'n Pay, Don Ncube of Real
Africa, Bill Venter of Altron to mention a few. For private unlisted companies it does not
matter much e.g. Edison Corporation, but when the company goes public independent
non-executive directors should dominate. This must be applicable to parastatals,
provincial and local government funded companies. Whilst the selection, compensation
and evaluation of chief executive is the single most important function of the board, the
appointment and approval of other members of top management remain also the
prerogative of the board of directors acting in concert with the CEG.
5.6.4 Non-executive Directors
Throughout our analysis we have attempted to show the important oversight role of the
board, the relevance and sacrocancy of independence for effective boards. It is agreed
that directors should not represent the interests of any particular stakeholder except the
best interest of the company. It is said and we concur that directors should;
• Maintain an attitude of constructive scepticism.
• Ask incisive probing questions and require accurate, honest answers
• Act with integrity
• Demonstrate a commitment to the corporation, its business plans and long-term
stakeholder value (Deakin· and Slinger 1997).
The boards' oversight function carries with it a number of specific duties, responsibilities,
obligations and personal liabilities. The question is no longer whether they should be
independent or not, because independence should be a given. The real question is how
independent are non-executive directors in corporate South Africa. How long should
they serve? South African boards are not only dominated by executive directors, but
inside non-executive directors.
In South Africa we should be striving to increase the number of independent non-
executive directors. Given that executive directors are a dominant factor in South
African boards, we recommend that the proportion between independent non-executive
directors and inside non-executive directors be 3: 1, this would ensure the 4:1 ratio
between non-executive directors as a group as against executive directors who should
be in a minority.
Non-executive directors have two important functions. The first as indicated already
reviewing the performance of the board and management. The second resolution of
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conflicts when they arise in the company e.g. when a takeover is imminent there might
be a conflict. Non-executive directors play a vital role in such situations there are many
instances of such conflict such as company and/or management might over-inflate share
value to encourage investment in the company. It might understate (or overstate costs)
for tax savings for instance, it can amortise short-term operational costs/debts to
improve balance sheets (Enron, WorldCom). Shareholders on the other hand might
ignore environmental/social costs (Petro Chemicals, Cape Asbestos Mining, Union
Carbide Chemical disaster in Bhopal India, Chemobyl Russian Nuclear Disaster etc.).
engage in socially responsible but poor performing activities. Given all these
possibilities, the independence of non-executive directors should not be undermined or
the need thereof be under estimated.
All directors whether non-executive or/and executive are the same in the eyes of the law,
despite the fact that non-executive directors are not in the day to day running of the
company. What does this mean? To keep independence and/or capacity to ensure this
independence.
One of the interesting aspects to examine in the future is whether non-executive
directors can on the one hand join with management as part of a unitary board deciding
on important matters of strategy and direction while on the other hand act as monitors of
executive directors in the best interest of the company.
5.6.5 GENDER EQUITY AND DIVERSITY
Whilst, we share the sentiments expressed by King 11 Report on gender equity and
diversity we are disappointed that there are no specific recommendations on targets.
Statements such as companies should strive for adequate representation of women in
top management and board levels have been said for so many years but nothing to
show for it on the ground. The need for women and black participation in the economy






This has long been paraded and understood; particularly that it makes business sense
(Magwaza)
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Our firm view is that this needs to be translated to mandatory plans and actionable
targets over a defined period, with stiff penalties for non-compliance.
The National African Federated Chamber of Commerce and industry (NAFCOC) was the
first black organisation more than 20 years ago to come up with targets based on a
programme aimed at empowering and developing blacks in business. It further identified
the role that the government should play in facilitating the implementation of the
programme.
The salient features of the NAFCOC's programme for black economic empowerment
relevant to our subject matter and popularly know as 3, 4, 5, 6 Programme are as
follows:
The programme sets the Year 2000 as a target by such time:
(i) 30% of seats of boards on companies quoted on the Johannesburg Stock
Exchange (JSE) should be occupied by blacks
(ii) 40% of equity should be held by blacks
(ili) 50% of inputs sourced should be from black enterprises
(iv) 60% of managerial posts should be held by blacks
No one needs to be reminded that these targets are not close to being achieved even in
2002.
This was followed by the black management forum (BMF) the Basotho Hat Formula in
1993.
The BMF resolved that within 7 years (by Year 2000) organisations in South Africa
should have reached these desirable targets:
30% of non-executive directors should be black
20% of executive directors should be black
30% of senior managers should be black
40% of middle managers should be black
50% of junior managers should be black
-- 10%~ofallsi.iperVisorsshoura oEr6iaClC-~
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80% of all trainees in any training and development programme should be black.
None of these targets have however been achieved. All sectors of the economy remain
dominated by white companies and white skilled people. Black penetration in sectors (in
terms of ownership) of the economy is still mini scale. (Black Economic Empowerment
Commission, 2001).
It should be clear that unless some form of punitive measures are introduced and linked
to these targets no one would take them seriously.
The findings of BEEC allude to these BEE targets and confirm that the country is still far
away from the goals that were set.
The BEEC recommendations will suffer the same fate as those of their older
counterparts. I.e. NAFCOC and BMF targets. The difference between BEEC and the
latter is that it is taken very seriously by the government of the day. Secondly whilst the
BEEC was initiated by the BMF in the late 1990's it enjoys the recognition of the Black
Business Council (BBC - an umbrella body of all black business and professional
organisations) and most importantly the confidence of the President himself. Members
nominated by the BBC serve in the Presidents Black Business Working Group. Finally,
the overall recommendations of the BEEC are now subject to an intense discussion by
the Cabinet Task team of the economic cluster ministries (finance, trade and industry,
minerals and energy, public enterprise, telecommunications and technology) together
with the Black Business Working Group.
Our stance is clear the BEEC recommendations on board composition should be made
mandatory and statutory. However, companies would be given a grace to achieve these
targets over a period of time, which would be discussed with all concerned.
The struggle for gender equality is a complex and protracted process. Whilst, statistics
could indicate that much progress has been made in SA showing a number of black
women being chairperson and/or chief executives and directors of leading institutions -
the task of integrating women remains elusive, as indicated, few women have made
significant impact. E.g:
o Wendy Luhabe - chairperson of Industrial Development Corporation (IDC),
Vodacom and director of many companies
o Mrs Nomazizi Mtshotshisa - chairperson of Telkom and director of IDC and
many others
o Gloria Serobe - chairperson of African Capital - formerly Metropolitan Life
o Or Renosi Mokate - chief executive Central Energy Fund. (CEF)
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o Mrs Zodwa Manase - chairperson of State Information Technology Company.
Director of CEF and many other companies.
o Mrs Manana Nhlanhla - chairperson of Trade and Investment KZN (TIK) and
Women Group in Energy and Director of many other companies
o Ms Monhla Hlahla - chief executive of the Airports Company.
o Ms Gugu Moloi - chief executive - Umgeni Water Board -
These women are a class of their own, exceptional and talented. They have made
marked strides in the corridors of corporate power. However, as the Hon. Minister Jeff
Radebe (Public Enterprises) rightly pointed out in his speech - titled - "The leadership
role of women in Public Enterprises" delivered on 16 August 2001 at the celebration of
Women's' Day - "But too often there is a tendency to seek comfort in statistics rather
than interpret them merely as indicator of an unfinished task. The statistics show for
example that number of women in top positions in management and the boardrooms of
industry have improved from a pitiful situation ". The dramatic percentage improvements
are a far cry given the dismal base from which they spring. Even the rate of progress
does not inspire confidence that the demographic reality would be reached in the
foreseeable future.
There is a further complication, as there is a tendency to appoint the same black women
in boards. (Even for that matter - white women directors such as Mrs E Le Bradley who
is one of the most sought after directors who serves in a number of boards including
blue chip companies such as Sasol, Tongaat-Huletts, Toyota etc.) These ladies are
overburdened with responsibilities. Restriction on the number of directorships one
individual can hold becomes relevant as alluded to elsewhere above. It is important to
say that this restriction has nothing to do with the ability or capacity or willingness of the
individual to carry out the duties, obligations and responsibilities. As Terence Craig
(Chief Investment Officer - Frater Asset Management) says - "The Rationale is obvious
- no matter how competent, an Executives' Effort (Directors or individuals effort)
becomes diluted by representation on too many boards. "
This malaise has afflicted former black politicians too. Drawing directors predominantly
from a singUlar base (e.g. early retired politicians or non profit and academic background
or community involvement) raises eyebrows. One of the criticisms of such appointments
is that most or some of these new incumbents are without a comprehensive business
background, resulting in their marginalisation.
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The tendency of appointing lone black voices in some leading SA companies should
be avoided too. Some board of directors have one black male or one black female or
one white female as a director. If this is not dangerous it is tokenism at its height. In
isolation, one or even two such board members often are not in a position to exercise
great influence. A group of three or four likeminded board members however can more
easily make their views known. They can make a difference and that counts.
Ensuring that board members are both diverse, in a broader sense of the word and
effective is a worthy goal but difficult to assess. Board of directors as the
representatives of shareholders with responsibility for oversight of top corporate
management have a special obligation to ensure that the board is adequately diversified.
Board diversity helps assure that the voice of all the companies' stakeholders are
adequately heard and that no one segment of the population disproportionately
dominates the thinking in the corridors of corporate power and that fresh insights from
varied viewpoints can be placed on the table at the highest level.
Union representation, directly in companies not through trade union investment
companies that are mushrooming is an issue we have not explored. However,
prominent former trade unionists are making inroads into boardrooms, (e.g. immediate
past president of National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) Mr J Matlatse serves in many
boards including Anglo Gold). There are many others like Marcel Golding who has
exchanged their union battle garb for twin striped business tuxedos. Can workers afford
to have some of their incumbent officials as board members in companies in which they
are employees? What if pension and provident funds appoint workers and/or their
officials to the board as their representatives? Undoubtedly this is another area for
further investigation.
The limited pool of directors in SA cannot be countenance if we are serious about
unleashing the full potential of our country. Companies serious about their survival,
success and long-term sustainability will take bold steps without any mandatory and/or
legislative prodding to implement gender equity and racial balance on one hand and
diversity on the other.
5.6.6 BOARD COMMITIEES
Committees of the board or board subcommittees are a must to facilitate effective
decisions making. Their importance can no longer be over emphasised to ensure board
effectiveness.
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The King 11 Report has recommended the establishment of audit and remuneration
committees. King 11 Report when appropriate sights nomination committees without
defining what is appropriate. We believe this is a glaring shortcoming, which cannot be
overlooked.
We therefore recommend that a nomination committee be a legal requirement for any,
company that intends listing, or that is a listed, parastatals, provincial and local
government funded entities.
Furthermore, we believe that a corporate governance compliance committee is central to
effective corporate governance.
In some organisations, such as, Durban Investment Promotion Agency and other
conglomerates the functions of the corporate governance compliance committee is part
of the audit committee and referred to as audit and corporate compliance committee.
Whilst, this is a welcome development, which suggests that at least corporate
governance compliance is receiving attention, we believe that the importance of
corporate governance compliance and its impact on board effectiveness requires serious
and separate attention. It must be treated and dealt with in its own right and not
drowned in equally important audit issues. Ralph D Ward in his article - "New
committees for a New Century" puts it so well when he says - "Corporations may find
that the increasingly strict demands of govemance reform are too serious to be imposed
on the traditional committee structure. Such tasks as shareholder liaison, succession
planning and board CEO evaluation are delicate, prone to management influence and
have serious long-term consequences for the company. Adding them to the roles of
audit, nominating and compensation committees may be more efficient but will the
ultimate result be as good? Also dividing govemance matters among several
committees, even with tight chartering process will increase overlap and turf disputes,
more companies are discovering the value of distinct corporate govemance committees"
We concur and support unequivocally. Corporate governance compliance committee
would ensure that strong corporate governance structures and mechanisms are in place
and that they are constantly reviewed to reflect internal corporate changes, legislative
changes and national and international developments in relation to corporate
governance.
One other issue that is relevant is the use of non-directors as members of the board
committees. We are warming up to this idea, despite King 11 Report's cautious approach
on it. King 1I Report says - "Board committees should as far as possible only comprise
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members of the board. It may be necessary where certain board committees fulfil
specialised role, to co-opt specialists as permanent members of such committees but
this should be the exception rather than the rule and they should compromise a minority
within the committee." Our attraction to the utilisation of outsiders in board committees
is not limited to the specialised perspective that they might bring. The committees could
be used as a training ground and a pool for new directors, especially for females and
blacks. They would get exposure to the workings of these board committees and gain
the necessary experience to qualify for full board membership. They should be used as
a breeding ground for new fully-fledged board members.
In conclusion we tend to agree with William G Bowen in his book "Inside the Boardroom
- Governance by Directors and Trustees" when he says "Whatever the size and the
structure, a cardinal principle is that committees should report to the board as a whole
and should not abrogate to themselves decision-making power. Committee structures
should reflect the needs of each organisation and should facilitate the exercise of
independent judgement by outside directors, inclUding the nomination of new directors"
5.7 COMPENSATION OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS
King I1 Report recommendations are very clear and concise in relation to the
compensation of directors.
Directors' emoluments have always revolved around five contentious issues:
o Level of pay
o Full disclosure
o Form of payment
o Link between level of pay and performance
o Should non-executive directors be paid in the same way as executive
directors?
Whilst King 11 addresses some of these issues the problems of compliance and
enforcement are glaringly evident. The recommendations still do not enjoy the
sanctity of law. Compliance and enforcement of most recommendations relies
heavily on peer pressure and so called global market forces to ensure good
corporate governance, adoption and implementation of the recommendations.
Off-course the JSE securities exchange does now require that all listed companies
comply but with only certain aspects of King 11 Report as laid out in Schedule 22 of
the JSE's listing requirements. Recently we have seen full disclosure of total
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remuneration packages of the CEG's by some listed companies. Something
unheard of 5 years ago. In-fact full disclosure of director's emoluments particularly
executive directors was vigorously resisted in South Africa when the first King Report
was in the making in 1994. The King I Report was even too soft compared to the UK
where the Companies Act demands far more explicit disclosure of the remuneration
of directors. The Cadbury report in UK says "The overriding principle in respect to
board remuneration is that of openness. Shareholders are entitled to a full and clear
statement of directors present and future benefits and how they have been
determined"
However, despite JSE requirements, companies not complying with these
requirements are not subject to any enforcement or/and sanction. What comes close
to sanction may be an "embarrassment". The JSE securities require companies to
spell out clearly in a statement the extent of its non-compliance with any principle in
the code and the period during which this occurred. Companies are not required to
state the reason for failure to comply nor the remedial action to be taken in future. It
is gratifying to note that JSE has now made it a requirement for all listed companies
to make full disclosure of directors total remuneration.
Performance linked compensation has gained currency. Such pay, it is argued align
and reduces the direct need for monitoring. Whether shareholders are involved with
the design of the reward system or not, which is a major assumption in this thinking
-------.-----. -Ts another matter because tne evidence is contrary to fhis. It is, however, interesting-
that the majority of share options in existence reward outcomes, but absolve
executives from poor performance. Evidence elsewhere in the world is abundant
showing huge increases in executive pay but not matching corporate performance.
Generally, the steady rise in director compensation that is becoming evident, at least
in the last decade, is a good sign. It is indeed certainly an indicator of how boards
have begun to matter.
We should regard this development as a sign of finally willing to pay for good
governance. The fact that time demands on the boards are growing. The workloads
and the dangers associated with being a director of a board, as a legal unit, have
also risen. Corporate governance has brought on added responsibilities on the
directors, and for their expected equal circumspection, they should be adequately
rewarded.
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The best corporate boards today just want to have it all, the very best executives and
leaders, available for their boards, when they want them. Of course, technology is
making this possible. The opportunity costs of these achievers being lost to the
company are high and, therefore, adequate compensation should be in place.
The rewards received by directors should reflect the extent to which individually and
collectively they are effective. Without clear objectives and agreed measure of the
extent to which they have been achieved, it is not easy to determine the basis for
remunerating directors.
Of late, it is becoming evident that a greater number of companies are becoming
more open and are prepared to disclose in annual accounts more than the legal
minimum concerning the compensation of directors.
Those boards that have non-executive directors should involve them in the review of
the remuneration of executive directors. Non-executive directors should not be paid
so little that they are not encouraged not to take their appointments seriously, nor so
much that they become over dependent on them and hence less inclined to be
independent and critical.
Stronger pressure must be applied to directors' particUlarly executive directors to be
accountable for their pay.
5.8 BOARD APPRAISAUEVALUTION
There is no question that the board of directors should develop performance
appraisal systems that are easy to implement and cost effective. This will help in
maintaining and improving productivity of the members of the board of directors.
An effective board should be self-critical. Whilst, the chairman should continuously
monitor the effectiveness of the board, the board itself should be periodically
involved in a review of its own activities, priorities and effectiveness. As the board is
the "fount of leadership", it should have its functions clearly categorized, mainly with
its priority function concerning itself with setting of the policy, objectives, strategy or
vision of the company. (Coulson 1993).
Secondary function should then be more of a proactive nature, that of controlling or
reviewing strategy, objectives, shareholder reqUirements or staff.
Critical periodic review of these functions is absolutely essential. Further, there
are other general principles that should be applied as critical factors in board
effectiveness and which actually make other boards more effective than others. As it
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was evident in our research the attitudes and the approach of our board is critical.
The board needs to exercise a strategic overview. Its priorities need to be
appropriate to the situation and circumstances of the company. Is its strategy
realistic? Does the board confront or avoid reality?
The conduct of business is also a critical factor in board effectiveness. For instance
does the board meet regularly and conduct formal business? The presentation of
information in board papers should be conducive to understanding; the process of
the board should allow for the efficient conduct of business and should focus upon
those things that are really important for customers and stakeholders.
The directorial qualities came out clearly in our research; the need for directors to be
competent and to understand the particular leadership requirements for successful
corporate transformation. Also, board effectiveness requires directors that are
perceptive, open and frank in raising issues, being rigorous and persistent in seeking
to reach "root" causes. Directors should be able to work as a harmonious team.
However, harmony should not be achieved at the cost of rigour, diversity and
challenge.
In terms of measurement of board effectiveness, it is agreed that the board is
entrusted with the responsibility of leading the company. The company today is not
only established primarily to achieve the various objectives of its owners or
shareholders but also to maximise and harmonise all stakeholder interest for the
long-term sustainability of the company and how well it does this will be determined
by its performance. Therefore it seems reasonable that by and large the board
effectiveness should be measured by the company performance.
It is vital that each board agrees to a means of monitoring and evaluating its own
contribution. Boards to measure their effectiveness can use standard models or
approaches but again it is important that their applicability is thought through.
Certain ground rules are necessary, like the main functions of the board for the
purposes of assessment need to be agreed. How these are defined and the
relevance of vision and values to the corporate context could itself be an indicator of
board effectiveness.
In respect of each agreed function, clear objectives should be set and these could be
accepted as a basis for performance measurement.
Actual performance need next to be assessed against those criteria's agreed upon.
Of course, quantitive performance targets are often easier to measure than
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qualitative ones. Measures of performance could be internal andlor external. Internal
measures would include e.g. return on capital or net assets, liquidity and other ratios
and net income or profit growth.
External measures include credit ratings, brand and corporate image, market share
data and other indices of satisfaction and loyalty.
Of course another useful measure of effectiveness is through assessment of
effectiveness of individual members of a board. How they conduct themselves in
meetings; how much value they bring to the company - in terms of questions,
contributions, ideas, leads and others.
Measurement andlor evaluation of individual members of the board and the board as
a whole are indeed a critical element in board effectiveness. Directors who are not
accountable, who know that their performance is not subject to any formal scrutiny
won't take their jobs as seriously as they should. Evaluation of directors would
ensure that we do away with the days when people were just appointed to numerous
boards and collect their pay cheque without recourse. In the words of Maletsatsi
Mosala in The Business Section of the City Press in her article uTalking Tax" -
"Simply put the days of champagne directors are gone - they have to take their
duties, responsibilities and obligations seriously - they are under spotlight"
We agree with King 11 Report that the nomination committee should take a leading
role in board appraisal and evaluation of individual board members. Ralph Ward
also agrees - "While the entire board shares the responsibility for its evaluation
process, nominating committee is an excellent organiser and a go between, the
committee also makes a good recruiter and liaison if an outside consultant is sought
to assist with the evaluation (an outsider is valuable for bringing third party objectivity
to the process). Board evaluation examines such topics as chairs influence and
effectiveness, the boards input, structure and contribution, and the value of the
present meeting, committee and communications systems. n
We, firmly believe in third party - outside involvement in board evaluation beyond the
self - critical evaluation expounded by King 11 Report.
We also further believe that structured evaluation of board members and the board
as a whole should be mandatory finding legal expression in the Companies Act.
Board appraisal deals with crucial issues of shareholder accountability, serving the
best interest of the company, productivity, maximising shareholders wealth and
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harmonising stakeholder interests, pay for performance, board effectiveness and
overall performance of the company.
5.9 SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM
Shareholder activism should be a welcome development as long as it encourages
constructive shareholder engagement. However it should not impinge on the rights of
other critical stakeholder groups for the company. Thirdly, it should be in line with the
requirements and recommendations of the King 11 Report and consistent with
international best practice.
Shareholder activism should not be the monopoly of powerful and influential institutional
investors. A mechanism should be found for minority and single individual shareholders
feelings to be harnessed and mobilised to prevent "Institutional dictatorships" that we
can see emerging in the horizon. We are however not saying that institutional investors
should not take a lead by using their muscle (SUbstantive shareholdings) for the benefit
of all.
Institutional investors who are in the forefront of shareholder activism include pension
and provident funds. These funds in actual fact are not owned by the asset managers
(who are very vocal) but, by ordinary workers. When are these asset managers and/or
pension and provident funds going to allow the voice and the ordinary workers the real
owners of these funds to be heard? What the asset managers are agitating for is
equally applicable to the workers in so far as the pension and provident funds are
concerned. The words of Dr Blade Nzimande - Secretary General of the South African
Communists Party are an ominous warning to asset managers / pension and provident
fund managers - "What role are these funds playing in job creation and confronting the
legacy of apartheid. The fund managers tended to invest money offshore and not
contribute to job creation and infrastructure development in South Africa. We cannot
leave these matters to asset managers. The owners of these funds, the workers, should
guide these managers".
Asset managers cannot expect board of directors to warm up to their ideas of placing
their own representative directors in boards in which they are shareholders whilst
shutting the door to workers sentiments (particularly deciding where, how and when their
hard earned funds should be invested.
It is encouraging to note that some asset managers have taken the cudgel on behalf of
minority shareholders such as Investee Asset Management in the Mettle de-listing
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debacle. Investee insisted that the offer to the minorities was too low. If this is a new
trend, not just a drop in an ocean it should be welcome with open arms.
Shareholder activism should go beyond maximisation of shareholders wealth but
maximisation of all stakeholders' loyalty and harnessing of all stakeholder interests.
David Wheeler and Maria Sillanpaa in their book - "The Stakeholder Corporation - A
Blue Print for Maximising Stakeholder Value" - say - "We have no doubt that
stakeholder - inclusive companies will outperform stakeholder - exclusive companies
with increasing ease in the 21 st Century. In future development of loyal relationships
with customers, employees, shareholders and other stakeholders will become one, the
most important determinants of commercial viability and business success. Increasing
shareholder value will be best served if the company cultivates the support of all those
who may influence its performance."
No doubt, shareholder activism rightly channelled and structured should impact not only
on the behaviour of companies including composition of boards but on their
effectiveness and overall performance. Finally we share the sentiments of King 11 Report
on shareholder activism as outlined in Chapter 6 of King Report.
5.10 CONCLUSION
Whilst our conclusions were based on our findings, direct and indirect involvement with
the corporate scene in South Africa,our recommendations are neither final nor
exhaustive. They also emanate from our research findings and coalface experience but
drew heavily from the views on King I1 Report on Corporate Governance for South
Africa. In fact, it was used as a base from which to build our case for improved
composition and effectiveness of boards.
Our recommendations revolved around issues of compliance, enforcement and
mandatory practices to ensure effective corporate governance thus board effectiveness.
Furthermore, we should not ignore the fact that whilst the King 11 Report is not in favour
of recommendations being legislated (Mervyn King was quoted as saying - "Legislating
the recommendations would be tantamount to corporate suicide'). legal mechanisms
were in place to encourage compliance. There is a whole section in the King 11 Report
outlining recommendations requiring statutory amendment and other relevant actions.
The cause for legal enforcement is totally not lost.
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Selection of directors, composition of boards and their effectiveness and other related
issues highlighted throughout this write-up are major elements of effective corporate
governance.
Whilst, we have no doubt that our recommendations would improve corporate
governance, through better composition of boards, selection, induction, training and
development of directors, well considered compensation packages, structured individual
evaluation of board members and appraisal of the board as a whole, an avenue for
further research exists. A similar study should be carried out in a much more broader
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